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1. INTRODUCTION 
The European legal dimension of an establishment of a European Unemployment Benefit 
Scheme (hereinafter: EUBS) is only little discussed. Namely the European Commission 
stated in its communication on ‘Strengthening the Social Dimension of the Economic and 
Monetary Union’1 in the chapter on EUBS: 
‘Such measures would require a substantial Treaty change, since, at present, 
the EU does not have the competence to adopt them, either for the euro area 
or for the EU as a whole. The EU cannot engage the budgetary responsibilities 
of its Member States. The EU’s current competences are limited, as regards 
employment, to incentive measures designed to encourage cooperation 
between Member States and to support their action, excluding any 
harmonisation (see Article 149 TFEU). As regards social security and social 
protection, its competence is limited to adopting directives setting minimum 
requirements for Member States’ systems whose fundamental principles and 
financial equilibrium are set by Member States (see Article 153 TFEU). Given 
the current framework of competences and the system of own resources of 
the Treaties, the flexibility clause of Article 352 cannot be used either, as the 
establishment of macroeconomic stabilisation systems would exceed the 
general framework of the current Treaties and thus amount to amending the 
Treaties without following the requisite procedures. In other words, this final 
stage would require a fundamental overhaul of the Treaties, which would also 
have to be accompanied — as detailed in the blueprint — by commensurate 
political integration, ensuring democratic legitimacy and accountability.’2 
The legal impossibility to introduce a EUBS within the existing Treaty framework is 
supported by Fuchs.3 In contrast to these statements, Kullas and Sohn4 concluded in a 
report that a ‘stormy day’ insurance could be realised on the basis of Article 122(2) TFEU 
and other equivalent systems on the basis of Article 352(1) TFEU. Eichenhofer5, Repasi6 
and Barnard and De Baere7 consider Article 153 TFEU as possible legal base. Next to 
these articles and statements, there are, until now, no in-depth legal analyses on 
possible European Unemployment Benefit Schemes. The present legal analysis refers to 
the existing Treaties and examines to which extent a EUBS can be established without a 
Treaty amendment.  
An in-depth legal analysis of the legal options and limits for the establishment of a 
European Unemployment Benefit Scheme has, as a first step, to break the several EUBS 
                                                 
1 European Commission, Communication of 2 October 2013, Strengthening the Social Dimension of 
the Economic and Monetary Union, COM(2013) 690 final. 
2 COM(2013) 690 final, p. 11 et seq. 
3 Fuchs, Statement ‘Assessing the impact of an EMU UBS on diverse national benefits systems: (To 
what extent) Do we need common eligibility rules?’ at the workshop ‘Neue Wege zur 
Stabilisierung der Eurozone’ on 11 October 2013 organised by the Bertelsmann-Stiftung. 
4 Kullas and Sohn, Europäische Arbeitslosenversicherung – Ein wirkungsvoller Stabilisator für den 
Euroraum?, cepStudie, April 2015. 
5 Eichenhofer, Europäische Arbeitslosenversicherung, ZESAR 2015, 259, 262 et seq. 
6 Repasi, Legal options for an additional EMU fiscal capacity, Study for the European Parliament 
2013, p. 26. 
7 Barnard and De Baere, Towards a European Social Union, Euroforum KU Leuven, 2014, p. 29. 
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options down into subsections. The legal framework requires a separate assessment of 
the payment side of the scheme and the conditions linked to it (2.) and of the financing 
side of the scheme (4.). This follows from the fact that the general Union budget in its 
current state has not enough financial means in order to finance any of the 18 EUBS 
options. By that, next to a legal act establishing a EUBS, there has to be an additional 
legal act to raise funds for the EUBS. Furthermore, any cash flow from the European 
Union to Member States has to be assessed against the so-called ‘no bail-out’-clause in 
Article 125 TFEU (3.). Finally, it has to be examined whether and to which extent those 
EUBS options that can be realised on the basis of the existing competences may also be 
adopted only by a subset of Member States (5.). 
It should be noted that the separate legal discussion of the payment side and of the 
financing side does not result, by definition, into the necessity to adopt separate legal 
acts. Separate legal acts would only be required if the identified bases cannot be 
combined with each other. Conclusions 
The debate around the creation of a Europe-wide shock absorber has been rekindled in 
recent years, but the initial idea dates back to the 1970s, as we show in our review. 
Based on an analysis of both recent and less recent work, we draw the following 
conclusions. 
2. LEGAL BASE FOR ESTABLISHING THE PAYMENT SIDE OF A EUBS 
The principle of conferral, enshrined in Article 5 TEU, requires that the Union shall act 
only within the limits of the competences conferred upon it by the Member States in the 
Treaties to attain the objectives set out therein. Therefore a legal basis has to be found 
in order to establish the payment side of a EUBS. The choice of legal basis for a measure 
is based on objective factors which are amenable to judicial review.8 Those factors 
include in particular the aim and content of the measure.9 A purely ancillary aim of a 
measure cannot legitimately be used to justify the choice of legal basis.10 The aim is not 
only to be defined by the Union legislator but must ‘in fact [pursue] the objectives stated 
by the Community legislature’11.12 If a Union measure pursues several aims that can be 
linked to several Union competences and if one of those aims is identifiable as the main 
one, whereas the other is merely incidental, the measure must be founded on a single 
legal basis, namely that required by the main or predominant aim.13 With regard to a 
measure that simultaneously pursues a number of objectives, which are inseparably 
linked without one being incidental to the other, the Court has held that, where various 
provisions of the Treaties are therefore applicable, such a measure will have to be 
founded, exceptionally, on the various corresponding legal bases.14 Such a conjunction of 
legal bases is, however, excluded if limitations of the one competence are not contained 
                                                 
8 CJEU, Case 45/86 Commission v Council [1987] ECR 1493 para. 11. 
9 CJEU, Case C-271/94 Parliament v Council [1996] ECR I-1689 para. 14 
10 CJEU, Case C-155/91 Commission v Council [1993] ECR I-939. 
11 Emphasis added. 
12 CJEU, Case C-376/98 Germany v European Parliament and Council [2000] ECR I-8419 para. 85.  
13 CJEU, Case C-155/07 Parliament v Council [2008] ECR I-8103 para 35. 
14 CJEU, Case C-155/07 Parliament v Council [2008] ECR I-8103 para 36; Case C-211/01 
Commission v Council [2003] ECR I-8913 para. 40. 
Feasibility and Added Value of a European Unemployment Benefit Scheme  
 
 2017  8 
in the other. Therefore a legal base that, for example, excludes legal harmonisation may 
not be combined with a legal base that allows for harmonisation. 
Based on these considerations, the identification of the suitable legal basis starts with a 
definition of the aim(s) of intended measure, at present of the establishment of the 
payment side of a EUBS. 
2.1. Aims of the payment side of the several EUBS options 
Despite the details, in which the 18 various options of EUBS differ, when it comes to 
defining the predominant aim pursued by these options, the basic distinction between 
equivalent and genuine EUBS becomes relevant.  
In brief, equivalent and genuine EUBS are to distinguished by the presence of a trigger 
for the activation of payments and by the recipient of the payment. Whilst in genuine 
systems the Fund payments are made once the risk of unemployment of an eligible 
person materialises, in equivalent systems, an additional trigger defines the event that 
activates payments from the Fund. This trigger is characterised by an indicator and a 
threshold: When the short-term unemployment rate (covering an unemployment period 
of 0 to 12 months) of a specific country at a specific time (indicator) exceeds the 
threshold, which is defined by the sum of 10 years moving average of the short-term 
unemployment rate in that country, payments from the EUBS Fund to the country in 
question are activated.15 As regards the recipient of payments from the EUBS fund, the 
amount defined by the eligibility criteria is, under the equivalent EUBS, transferred to the 
general budget of the Member State concerned, whilst, under the genuine EUBS, the 
recipient of the payment is the eligible person itself. 
Equivalent EUBS are, against this background, characterised by a transfer of a lump sum 
that is calculated on the basis of short-term unemployment from a European fund to the 
national general budget. The transfer takes place once the short-term unemployment 
rate deviates from the usual average rate of the country concerned. Such a deviation can 
usually be led back to on an economic crisis that hit this country. By that, equivalent 
EUBS contain financial transfers in case of an economic crisis. In contrast to this, genuine 
EUBS work like classical insurances, in which the materialisation of the insured risk 
triggers the payment to the insured eligible person.  
These distinctive features of equivalent EUBS, on the one hand, and genuine EUBS, on 
the other, reveal the aims pursued by the respective scheme. Equivalent EUBS 
predominantly aim at macroeconomic stabilisation in order to mitigate the effects of an 
economic crisis. This does not exclude that equivalent EUBS can also have positive 
effects on the overall social standard of unemployed people. Yet, the fact that the 
financial support of national budgets is not earmarked for the exclusive use of these 
amounts for unemployed people clearly shows that equivalent EUBS pursues the 
objective of stabilising national budgets. In contrast to this, genuine EUBS aim at 
mitigating the social risk of getting unemployed by paying the financial support directly 
to the person concerned and by abstaining from any additional criteria for payment than 
those linked to unemployment and eligibility. Genuine EUBS aim hence primarily at 
insuring social risks and at strengthening social cohesion. A stabilising effect for national 
budgets in times of economic crisis is not excluded by this aim but rather to be 
considered as a welcome side effect of the genuine EUBS than a primary objective. 
                                                 
15 It is recalled that the several presently proposed triggers distinguish between the severity of the 
increase of short-term unemployment, which are 0.1%, 1% and 2% of increased short-term 
unemployment in a quarter of a year as compared to the average short-term unemployment 
rate of the last 40 quarters of a year. 
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In sum, equivalent EUBS predominantly aim at stabilising national budgets in times of 
economic crises, whereas genuine EUBS predominantly aim at insuring the social risks of 
unemployment of workers. 
Against this background, possible legal bases for genuine EUBS (2.2) and for equivalent 
EUBS (2.3) can be identified and examined regarding their suitability to establish the 
payment side of EUBS on their basis. Finally, a closer look will be taken at Article 352(1) 
TFEU, which may serve as a legal base for both kinds of EUBS in case there can no 
suitable legal base be identified as well as an additional legal base to compensate for 
weaknesses found in more specific legal bases (2.4). Table 1 shows the possible legal 
bases as assigned to the identified predominant aims of the several EUBS options.  
Table 1. Possible legal bases 
Predominant aim Possible legal bases 
 21(3) 48 121(6) 122(2) 148 153(2)(b) 175(3) 352(1) 
Promoting social cohesion 
(genuine EUBS)         
Macroeconomic stabilisation in 
case of (exogenous) crisis 
(equivalent EUBS) 
        
 
2.2. Legal base for EUBS aiming at promoting social cohesion (genuine 
EUBS) 
The possible specific legal bases that serve to attain the objective of promoting social 
cohesion are (in numerical order) Article 21(3) TFEU (measures concerning social 
security or social protection in the context of the free movement of Union citizens) 
(2.2.4), Article 48 TFEU (measures concerning social security in the context of the free 
movement of workers) (2.2.3), Article 148 TFEU (coordination of employment policies) 
(2.2.2), Article 153(2)(b) TFEU (minimum requirements in the field of social security and 
social protection of workers) (2.2.5) and Article 175(3) TFEU (specific actions in order to 
strengthen social cohesion) (2.2.6). Before, however, turning to the discussion of the 
suitability of the identified legal bases, the relationship between genuine EUBS and the 
national unemployment benefit scheme (NUBS) in the territory of the Member State is to 
be explored and to be defined for the purposes of the subsequent discussion of the legal 
bases (2.2.1).    
2.2.1 Co-existence of EUBS and NUBS in the territory of the Member States 
The relationship between genuine EUBS and NUBS in the territory of the Member States 
has to be defined before looking into the details of the various legal bases. This is 
necessary since the effect on national law of the measures that can be adopted on the 
basis of EU legal bases differs. They can either require an implementation into national 
law so that existing national law has to be adapted. As a consequence EU law does, in 
principle, not co-exist on the territory of the Member States. Or EU measures can be 
stand-alone next to existing national law. In this case a conflict rule has to decide which 
rules take precedence in a situation where EU and national law overlaps. 
There is no explicit definition of the relationship between genuine EUBS and NUBS in the 
territory of the Member States. It is, however, stated that genuine EUBS can be either 
designed as basic EUBS, in which each participating Member State remains free to 
increase the amount paid by the EUBS, its duration or include non-eligible people at its 
own expense, or as a top-up EUBS, in which the supranational fund supplements the 
payments of the national fund by the necessary amount to meet the requirements set by 
Feasibility and Added Value of a European Unemployment Benefit Scheme  
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the EUBS.16 Both variants suggest a co-existence of EUBS and NUBS in the territory of 
the Member States rather than a merger of NUBS with EUBS. They only differ with regard 
to the conflict rule that is used in order to define the relationship between both schemes. 
In order to increase the amount of the unemployment benefit, its duration or to extend 
benefits to people that are not eligible under the EUBS, an entire stand-alone national 
scheme must be in place, which defines autonomously its legal conditions. On a more 
abstract level, the European unemployment benefit, as defined by the rules governing 
the EUBS, co-exists next to the pre-existing national unemployment benefit, as defined 
by the rules governing EUBS. In case of an overlap of both benefits (with regard to the 
amount, its duration or the eligibility criteria) a conflict rule defines, which benefit takes 
precedence over the other and which fund therefore pays for the benefit.  
In the basic genuine EUBS, the conflict rule defines that in case of an overlap the EUBS 
takes precedence over the NUBS. Within the scope of application of the EUBS, the 
European benefit supersedes the national benefit. If the NUBS is more generous than the 
EUBS, the national benefit can still be paid to the eligible person. The conflict rule that 
requires the application of the EUBS is not applicable because of a lack of conflict 
between the European and national benefit when the latter is more generous than the 
former. In the top-up genuine EUBS, the conflict rule defines that in case of an overlap 
the NUBS takes precedence over the EUBS. This means that only in cases, in which there 
is no overlap of the national and the European benefit (e.g. because the European benefit 
covers a higher amount, has a longer duration or requires different eligibility criteria than 
the national benefit) the EUBS is applicable. In all cases, in which the NUBS is outside 
the scope of application of EUBS, there is no legal obligation to adapt the conditions of 
the national benefit as defined by national law to the ones defined by the EUBS. 
In brief, EUBS is a stand-alone measure that co-exists within its scope of application in 
the territory of the Member States. In case of an overlap with the existing NUBS, a 
conflict rule defines which of the benefits takes precedence over the other. If an EUBS 
legal act remains silent on the conflict rule, the EU principle of supremacy17 applies, 
according to which EU law takes precedence over conflicting national law. 
Based on this understanding of the legal relationship between genuine EUBS and NUBS, 
the possible legal bases that were identified as possibly suitable for establishing the 
payment side of EUBS can be further discussed in the following. 
2.2.2 Coordination of employment policies (Article 148 TFEU) 
Under Article 148 TFEU, Member States’ employment policies shall be coordinated by 
‘soft law’ instruments. Broad guidelines adopted by the Council on the basis of 
conclusions of the European Council set certain policy goals, which are to be achieved by 
the Member States. The European Commission monitors the implementation but does not 
have any enforcement instruments in case of persistent non-compliance. 
Soft law instruments and coordination processes are no appropriate means to introduce 
any kind of EUBS and Article 148 TFEU can therefore not be considered as an appropriate 
legal base for EUBS. 
                                                 
16 Cf. Beblavý, Lenaerts and Maselli, Report on Task 1C, E.6 and E.7. 
17 Cf. CJEU, Case 6/64, Costa v ENEL [1964] ECR 585. 
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2.2.3 Social security in the context of the free movement of workers (Article 48 
TFEU) 
On the basis of Article 48 TFEU, the European Parliament and the Council may adopt 
measures, in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, in the field of social 
security. The measure must be necessary for the establishment and for the functioning of 
the free movement of workers. The scope of this legal base is therefore linked to the 
scope of the free movement of workers in Article 45 TFEU. According to settled case law 
of the CJEU, Article 45 TFEU cannot be applied to activities that are confined in all 
respects within a single Member State.18 By that, legal acts adopted on the basis of 
Article 48 TFEU may only deal with social security matters relating to migrant workers. 
This is reflected by Article 2(1) of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 on the coordination of 
social security systems, which was based on the former Articles 42 and 308 EC (which 
are today’s Articles 48 and 352 TFEU), according to which the regulation shall apply ‘to 
nationals of a Member State […] residing in a Member State who are or have been 
subject to the legislation of one or more Member States, as well as to the members of 
their families and to their survivors’. Article 48 TFEU is therefore no legal base for 
measures that are to be applied to all residents of a Member State. It should, however, 
be noted that on the basis of another legal base such as Article 79(2)(b) TFEU rights that 
were defined under Article 48 TFEU may be extended to third-country nationals.19 
Since all options of a EUBS are to be applied to workers who became unemployed 
independently of whether they made use of their free movement rights, the objectives 
pursued by none of the EUBS options could be achieved by a legal act based on Article 48 
TFEU.  
2.2.4 Social security or social protection in the context of the free movement of 
Union citizens (Article 21(3) TFEU) 
According to Article 21(3) TFEU, the Council may adopt ‘measures concerning social 
security and social protection’. The purposes for secondary law adopted on the basis of 
Article 21(3) TFEU must be the same as ‘those referred to in paragraph 1’, which 
contains the right of every Union citizen to move and to reside freely within the 
territories of the Member States. The free movement rights of Union citizens do not cover 
internal situations, which have no link with Union law.20 Based on this consideration, 
measures concerning social security or social protection, which are to be adopted on the 
basis of Article 21(3) TFEU, may only regulate the situations of Union citizens that made 
already use or will make use of their free movement rights. Domestic situations can, 
however, not be subject matter of rules adopted under Article 21(3) TFEU. 
Since all options of a EUBS are to be applied to Union citizens who became unemployed 
independently of whether they made use of their free movement rights, the objectives of 
none of the options could be achieved by a legal act based on Article 21(3) TFEU. 
                                                 
18 CJEU, Case C-41/90 Höfner and Elser [1991] ECR I-1979, para. 37; Case C-332/90 Steen [1992] 
ECR I-341, para. 9; Joined Cases C-29/94 to C-35/94 Aubertin and Others [1995] ECR I-301, 
para. 9. 
19 Regulation (EU) No 1231/2010 extending Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 and Regulation (EC) No 
987/2009 to nationals of third countries who are not already covered by these Regulations 
solely on the ground of their nationality, [2010] OJ L 344, p. 1. 
20 CJEU, Joined Cases C-64/96 and C-65/96, Uecker and Jacquet [1997] ECR I-3171 para. 23; 
Case C-434/09, McCarthy [2011] ECR I-3375 para. 45. 
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2.2.5 Minimum requirements in the field of social security and social protection 
of workers (Article 153(2)(b) TFEU) 
The European Parliament and the Council may, based on Article 153(2)(b) TFEU, adopt, 
by means of directives, minimum requirements for gradual implementation in matters 
concerning the social security and social protection of workers (Article 153(1)(c) TFEU). 
2.2.5.1 Scope of Article 153(1)(c) TFEU 
In order to legislate on the basis of Article 153(2)(b) TFEU, the subject matter of the 
legal act has to be covered by one of the fields referred to in Article 153(1)(a) to (i) 
TFEU. Article 153(1)(c) TFEU relates to matters of ‘social security and social protection of 
workers’. 
‘Social security’ can be defined in line with Article 48 TFEU and Article 3(1) of Regulation 
(EC) No 883/2004 on the coordination of social security systems as covering ‘sickness 
benefits’, ‘maternity and equivalent paternity benefits’, ‘invalidity benefits’, ‘old-age 
benefits’, ‘survivors’ benefits’, ‘benefits in respect of accidents at work and occupational 
diseases’, ‘death grants’, ‘unemployment benefits’, ‘pre-retirement benefits’ and ‘family 
benefits’. Article 3(2) of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 clarifies that the notion of ‘social 
security’ does not relate to financing of the system, so that ‘general and special social 
security schemes, whether contributory or non-contributory’ are covered by this term. 
‘Social protection’ is understood broader than ‘social security’ and, by that, referring to 
all kinds of collective systems established in order to protect workers against social risks. 
Again in line Article 48 TFEU and Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 ‘social protection’ can be 
understood as covering ‘schemes relating to the obligations of an employer or shipowner’ 
(Article 3(2)) and ‘to the special non-contributory cash benefits’ (Article 3(3)). The 
Regulation defines the latter as ‘cash benefits which are provided under legislation which, 
because of its personal scope, objectives and/or conditions for entitlement, has 
characteristics both of the social security legislation referred to in Article 3(1) and of 
social assistance’ (Article 70).21 
It is worth mentioning that Article 153(1)(c) TFEU refers to ‘workers’, which means that 
this field covers only those social security and social protection provisions that relate to 
workers. Social allowances are, hence, not covered by this field. 
2.2.5.2 Limiting elements of Article 153 TFEU 
Article 153 TFEU contains several limiting elements. A legal act adopted on the basis of 
Article 153(2)(b) TFEU may (1) only contain ‘minimum requirements for gradual 
implementation, having regard to the conditions and technical rules obtaining in each of 
the Member States’, (2) not ‘affect the right of Member States to define the fundamental 
principles of their social security systems’, (3) not ‘significantly affect the financial 
equilibrium’ of the social security system and (4) only be a directive. 
2.2.5.2.1 Minimum requirements for gradual implementation, having regard to 
the conditions and technical rules obtaining in each of the Member States 
(Article 153(2)(b) TFEU) 
The reference to ‘minimum requirements’ was introduced by the Single European Act as 
Article 118a(2) EEC. This reference has to be read in conjunction with Article 153(4) 
second intend TFEU, according to which Member States are regardless of legislation 
                                                 
21 Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 enumerates the covered ‘special non-contributory cash benefits’ 
according to Article 70(2)(c) in its Annex X. 
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adopted under this Article free to maintain or to introduce ‘more stringent protective 
measures compatible with the Treaties’. Both limitations have to be understood in 
contrast to the other legislative technique in EU law that aims at establishing more 
unified standards within the Internal Market, which is ‘harmonisation’. First, 
harmonisation, if based on Articles 114(1) or 115 TFEU, aims at the establishment and 
the functioning of the internal market. It also sets minimum requirements. But, when 
there is internal market harmonisation, Member States are not anymore allowed to 
introduce ‘more stringent protective measures’ than those set by the harmonising 
directive. Member States are only free in adopting standards that are more liberal. 
Against this background, it becomes clear that minimum requirements set under Article 
153 TFEU mean precisely the opposite. Under Article 153 TFEU Member States are still 
free to introduce higher protective standards than those set by an EU directive. Second, 
the concept of ‘harmonisation’ may also include ‘maximum harmonisation’, which does 
not allow for any deviations by Member States anymore. The reference to ‘minimum 
requirements’ excludes the possibility to adopt a directive, which harmonises national 
legislation covered by its subject matter in an exhaustive manner. 
It is important to note in this context that the reference to ‘minimum requirements’ does 
not mean that the Union may only adopt the minimum of all existing protective standards 
in the Member States’ legal orders. The Union is free, in accordance with the principles of 
proportionality and subsidiarity under Article 5 TEU, to set own minimum requirements, 
which may result in some national legal orders in a legal obligation to raise the national 
level of protection.22 
The reference to ‘gradual implementation, having regard to the conditions and technical 
rules obtaining in each Member State’ specifies that the Union legislator has to take the 
specific legal and factual situations in each of the Member States into account when 
legislating on the basis of Article 153(2)(b) TFEU. A directive based on this Article may 
not set a minimum requirement, which is unrealistic and hard to achieve for one of the 
Member States. This reference is of particular importance when the Council may decide 
in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, which means that a Member State 
can be overruled by a qualified majority of Member States. This is the case in fields 
referred to in Article 153(1)(a), (b), (e), (h) and (i) TFEU. Since in the field of social 
security and social protection referred to in Article 153(1)(c) TFEU a measure may only 
be adopted if there is a unanimity in the Council, the reference to ‘gradual 
implementation, having regard to the conditions and technical rules obtaining in each 
Member State’ is, in fact, of no relevance since a non-observance of particularities of a 
national legal order would have been sanctioned by a veto during the legislative 
procedure. 
2.2.5.2.2 Right of Member States to define the fundamental principles of their 
social security systems (Article 153(4) first indent TFEU) 
Article 153(4) first indent TFEU states that legal acts ‘adopted pursuant to this Article […] 
shall not affect the right of Member States to define the fundamental principles of their 
social security systems’. The Treaties refer to the notion of ‘shall not affect’ when the 
Treaty makers intended to protect national competences from ‘intrusion’ of EU law. 
                                                 
22 CJEU, Case C-84/94, United Kingdom v Council [1996] ECR I-5755, para. 56: ‘Furthermore, as is 
clear from paragraph 17 of this judgment, the applicant bases its argument on a conception of 
"minimum requirements" which differs from that in Article 118a. That provision does not limit 
Community action to the lowest common denominator, or even to the lowest level of protection 
established by the various Member States, but means that Member States are free to provide a 
level of protection more stringent than that resulting from Community law, high as it may be.’ 
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Provisions containing the notion of ‘shall not affect’ can therefore be understood as 
‘constitutional saving clauses’.23  
Article 153(4) first indent TFEU constitutes, in this respect, a special constitutional saving 
clause since it does not shield Member States’ competence to adopt social security laws 
but only their power ‘to define the fundamental principles of their social security 
systems’. This means that Union legislator may, in principle, adopt secondary law relating 
to social security law. Yet the Union legislator is not allowed to interfere with the 
fundamental design of the respective social security system. As already stated in Article 
153(1) TFEU, the union legislator may only ‘support and complete’ the social security and 
social protection system of the Member States. To ‘support and complete’ does not 
mean, as stated above, that the scope of the Union measure depends on the scope of the 
national social security law. The Union legislator is, in principle, entitle to also introduce 
elements that are new for the social security system of a Member State provided that the 
overall level of protection is raised. Therefore not any minimum requirement introduced 
by an EU legal act that has no counterpart in national law affects fundamental principles 
of the national social security system. Against this background, one has to draw a line 
between those provisions of the national security systems that reflect fundamental 
principles and those that can be subject of an EU legal act. 
As a starting point for drawing this line, it is important to recall that the reason for the 
reference to the ‘fundamental principles’ is the variety of ‘welfare regimes’ in Europe, 
which evolved historically and differ with regard to their ordering principles. By that, the 
principles that define the distinctive features of the different welfare state categories 
form the core of the ‘fundamental principles’ whose right to define may not be affected 
by EU legislation.24 Based this consideration, the way of how social security systems are 
financed (by contributions or by taxes) are excluded from setting minimum 
requirements. Furthermore, all those rules that implement the ordering principles of the 
national social security system in question are covered by the constitutional saving 
clause. This refers, in particular, to the definition of certain eligibility criteria.  
On the other side of the dividing line, there are rules that relate to the control of the 
overall expenses of a social security system without implementing ordering principles. 
Those rules are not covered by the notion of ‘fundamental principles of the social security 
systems of the Member States’. This can be drawn from the fact that Article 153(4) first 
indent TFEU mentions explicitly the ‘financial equilibrium’ of social security systems next 
to the ‘fundamental principles’. If rules safeguarding the financial equilibrium of a social 
security system had already been covered by ‘fundamental principles’, it would not be 
convincing to explicitly mention them in the same indent. Against this background, 
national provisions including eligibility criteria, whose purpose is only to control the 
overall expenses of a social security system, but which do not to specify the ordering 
principles of the social security system are not covered by the constitutional saving 
clause protecting the Member States’ right to define the fundamental principles of their 
social security systems.  
Finally, it is worth mentioning that the adoption of a legal act in the field of ‘social 
security and social protection of workers’ (Article 153(1)(c) TFEU) requires a unanimous 
vote in the Council. Since therefore every Member State that considers the ‘fundamental 
principles’ of its social security system to be affected by the legal act may raise its veto 
against this act, the adoption of such a legal act establishes in case of a legal review of 
                                                 
23 Schütze, in: Oxford Handbook of European Union law, EU competences, p. 81 et seq. 
24 This relates to the main categories of ‘Social Democratic’, ‘Conservative’ and ‘Liberal’ welfare 
states, cf. Esping-Anderson, The three worlds of welfare capitalism, 1990. 
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this act the presumption that this act does not affect the fundamental principles of the 
social security systems of the Member States.  
2.2.5.2.3 Not significantly affecting the financial equilibrium of the social 
security systems of the Member States (Article 153(4) first indent TFEU) 
As the first alternative under Article 153(4) first indent TFEU, the second alternative 
referring to ‘the financial equilibrium of the social security systems of the Member States’ 
is a constitutional saving clause. It, however, does not exclude adopting European rules 
that may affect the national public budgets financing their social security systems. Those 
rules may only not ‘significantly’ affect the ‘financial equilibrium’ of the social security 
systems.  
From a legal perspective, one may draw two conclusions from the wording of the second 
limitation in Article 153(4) first indent TFEU. First, the reference to ‘financial equilibrium’ 
clarifies that national rules relating to the financing of the social security systems may, in 
principle, be subject of a harmonisation under Article 153(2)(b) TFEU. By the same 
token, the requirement of affecting the ‘financial equilibrium’ allows for adopting rules 
that have a financial impact on the national social security systems. Rules affecting the 
‘financial equilibrium’ of social security systems are ultimately something different than 
rules affecting the financing of social security systems. Based on this consideration, the 
constitutional saving clause referring to the financial equilibrium of national social 
security systems can be understood as a prohibition for the Union to adopt measures that 
are disproportionate with regard to the financing of national social security systems.  
This shows that the reference to the second limitation, namely that the financial 
equilibrium should not be ‘significantly’ affected, defines, which Union measures are to be 
considered disproportionate in relation to the financial obligations attached to them. The 
use of the word ‘significantly’ clarifies, first of all, that Union legislation may at least 
‘insignificantly’ affect the financial equilibrium of national social security systems. In 
other words, Union legislation may lead to an increase in expenses of the national social 
security systems as long as the threshold of ‘significance’ is not exceeded. Yet, defining 
‘significance’ in legal terms is difficult. The reference point for an elaboration of a 
definition is the overall financial situation of a national social security system. This means 
that both the increased expenses because of an EU measure as well as the potential 
income stemming from an EU measure over a long period have to be taken into account 
when assessing the impact on the financial equilibrium. If after comparing the overall 
financial situation of a national social security system before and after the entry into 
force of an EU measure the system cannot meet its financial obligations vis-à-vis people 
that are eligible under national law anymore, the threshold of significance is exceeded if 
the Member State has to raise contributions or taxes refinancing its social security 
systems in a more than modest manner. Modest increases in contributions or taxes 
would still be insignificant to the financial equilibrium of the national social security 
system. Based on these considerations, the financial equilibrium of the social security 
system of a Member States is affected by an EU measure if the system cannot finance its 
remaining own commitments vis-à-vis the eligible people without having to raise 
permanently contributions or taxes in a more than modest manner. 
In this context it is important to note that legislating in the field of ‘social security and 
social protection of workers’ (Article 153(1)(c) TFEU), which affects public budgets of the 
Member States the most, requires a unanimous vote in the Council (Article 153(2)(3) 
TFEU). Since the best in place to evaluate whether the financial equilibrium of their social 
security systems is affected are the Member States themselves, the unanimous adoption 
of a legal act based on Article 153(2)(b) TFEU establishes in case of a legal review of this 
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act a presumption that the financial equilibrium of the social security systems of the 
Member States is not significantly affected by this legal act.25 
2.2.5.2.4 Directive as the only admissible means for Union legislation based on 
Article 153(2)(b) TFEU  
Finally, legal acts based on Article 153(2)(b) TFEU may only be adopted as directives. 
According to Article 288(3) TFEU, directives ‘shall be binding, as to the result to be 
achieved, upon each Member State to which it is addressed, but shall leave to the 
national authorities the choice of form and methods’. Directives do, in principle, not 
contain individual rights but oblige Member States to create individual rights within their 
national legal orders. Only if, after the expiry of the implementation period, Member 
States have not implemented or have wrongly implemented a directive so that there are 
no individual rights in the national legal order, an individual may vis-à-vis the public 
authorities directly rely upon a provision of the directive. 
In any event, the Union legislator may not establish, on the basis of directives, Union 
bodies or Union funds as well as legal claims for individuals against Union bodies or 
funds. 
2.2.5.3 Article 153(2)(b) TFEU as a legal base for EUBS? 
At the outset, it is worth recalling that because of the presence of a trigger the 
equivalent EUBS options that form the object of this study pursue mainly the objective of 
macroeconomic stabilisation (see sections 2.1 and 2.3). These options can therefore not 
be based on Article 153(2)(b) TFEU, which, read in conjunction with Article 153(1)(c) 
TFEU, empowers the Union to adopt measures in the field of ‘social security and social 
protection of workers’. A benefit scheme that can only be applied to unemployed workers 
after the activation of a certain trigger cannot be considered as contributing to the ‘social 
security’ or the ‘social protection’ of workers. Such scheme must be permanent in order 
to so. Thus the equivalent EUBS options that form the object of this study cannot be 
based on Article 153(2)(b) TFEU. 
2.2.5.3.1 Independent EUBS is no minimum requirement 
The remaining EUBS options that aim at improving the situation of short-term 
unemployed people and at promoting social cohesion could, in principle, be based on 
Article 153(2)(b) TFEU as they contribute to the ‘social security and social protection of 
workers’ in terms of Article 153(1)(c) TFEU. Yet the core feature of a EUBS option, which 
mainly pursues an objective covered by Article 153(1)(c) TFEU, to look at when 
considering its eventual adoption on the basis of Article 153(2)(b) TFEU is its relationship 
with the existing national UBS. This is because of two reasons. First, Article 153(2)(b) 
TFEU allows only for setting ‘minimum requirements for gradual implementation, having 
regard to the conditions and technical rules obtaining in each Member State’. Second, the 
only kind of act available for legislating under Article 153(2)(b) TFEU are directives. 
Minimum requirements defined in a directive under Article 153(2)(b) TFEU need a 
transposition into national law. Against this background, a Union legal act, which is based 
on this article, aims at modifying national provisions in a way that all national legal 
orders are supposed to contain the same set of minimum requirements. In return, a 
Union act, which intends to establish rules that are independent from existing national 
                                                 
25 It is worth mentioning that a ’presumption’ does not exclude, by definition, that there can be a 
threat to the financial equilibrium of national social security systems even if there was a 
unanimous vote in the Council. Yet the margin for the CJEU to declare such a unanimous vote 
void because of a threat to the financial equilibrium of national public budgets is quite narrow if 
one takes into account that it lies within the political competence of the Member States’ 
national institutions to decide on matters relating to their financial situation. 
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provisions and that do not have to be implemented into national law, cannot be based on 
Article 153(2)(b) TFEU. 
In principle, the 14 genuine EUBS options that form the object of this study define the 
conditions for payment (e.g. eligibility), the amount of the payment (e.g. reference 
wage, replacement rate, capping, cyclical variability) and the duration of the payment 
themselves without reference to national UBS. Genuine EUBS are not intended to be a 
part of the national UBS but separate from it. Both co-exist in the territory of the Member 
States. Where both schemes overlap, EUBS as a Union instrument would take 
precedence over the NUBS. NUBS would still be entitled to top up or to pay benefits to 
beneficiaries, which would not be covered by EUBS (see section 2.2.1). The relationship 
between these genuine EUBS options and the national UBS already argues against the 
use of Article 153(2)(b) TFEU as suitable legal base. Furthermore, Article 153(2)(b) TFEU 
does not allow for adopting regulations but only for adopting directives. A Union agency 
that administers the EUBS or a fund that collects and pays out the benefit can, however, 
only be established by means of a regulation. By that, none of the 14 genuine EUBS 
options could be established on the basis of Article 153(2)(b) TFEU.  
Going beyond the EUBS options that form the object of this study, one may, however, 
think about using Article 153(2)(b) TFEU in order to define minimum requirements for 
national unemployment benefits at Union level. There would be no co-existence of EUBS 
and national UBS in the territory of the Member States since the EU legal act would only 
refine the existing national unemployment benefits. In return for the implementation of 
minimum requirements into the NUBS, a European fund or a European clearing 
mechanism would transfer lump sums, which are calculated in accordance with criteria 
defined by an EU legal act, to the national unemployment budgets. ‘EUBS’ understood as 
minimum requirements combined with financial support would hence be national and 
based on national rights, but defined and (partly) financed by the European level. 
Amongst the 18 EUBS options that form the object of the present study, the equivalent 
EUBS options come the closest to this alternative. Under the equivalent EUBS options, 
the criteria set at Union level define the amount to be transferred to NUBS, whilst the 
definition of the actual benefit remains national but bound to certain minimum 
requirements. Yet and that’s how the equivalent EUBS options are to distinguished from 
the just developed alternative option by the fact that under the former the lump sum is 
only transferred from the EU to the Member State concerned once a certain threshold 
(the ‘trigger’) is exceeded (see section 2.1).26 Crucial for eventually basing this 
alternative EUBS option on Article 153(2)(b) TFEU is, however, that the minimum 
requirements do not affect ‘fundamental principles’ of the unemployment insurance 
system of the Member States as protected by Article 153(4) first indent TFEU (see 
section 2.2.5.2.3). Since none of the equivalent EUBS options that form the object of this 
study reflects this shortly described alternative EUBS option, any further elaboration on 
the question which minimum requirements would be covered by Article 153(2)(b) TFEU 
would surpass the scope of the present study and will therefore not be further addressed. 
2.2.5.3.2 Accompanying measures covering minimum requirements with regard 
to the regulation of NUBS 
Whilst being legally separate from national UBS, a genuine EUBS will nevertheless affect, 
in economic terms, the co-existing national UBS (see also section 2.2.6.3.2). One can 
easily imagine that the creation of a genuine EUBS can put in place a convergence of 
national schemes towards the European one in order to smooth the transition between 
                                                 
26 It is worth recalling that the 4 equivalent EUBS options that form the object of this study cannot 
be based on Article 153(2)(b) TFEU since they mainly pursue the objective of macroeconomic 
stabilisation whilst the impact on ‘social security and social protection of workers’ is only 
ancillary because of the presence of the trigger. 
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the safety net of the European scheme and their own. It appears therefore to be 
recommended, in the context of genuine EUBS options, to adopt supplementing 
legislation on the basis of Article 153(2)(b) TFEU, which sets certain minimum 
requirements for national UBS in order to improve the legal coordination between 
national UBS and EUBS.  
Such accompanying measures with regard to the regulation of NUBS appear even to be 
necessary when an equivalent EUBS option is to be established. As described above, 
under equivalent EUBS, the European level only defines a lump sum, which is transferred 
to NUBS and to be paid out by the national authorities in accordance with national law. 
There is a significant risk of divergence between the criteria set for the calculation of the 
lump sum at EU level and the criteria set at national level for the subsequent use of the 
lump sum. The bigger the divergence becomes, the more the EUBS lump sum turns into 
a simple subsidy of NUBS and risks to run counter the ‘no bail-out’ clause in Article 
125(1) TFEU, as will be explained later in section 3. 
Such minimum requirements with regard to the regulation of national UBS may, 
however, not affect fundamental principles of the respective national UBS. Fundamental 
principles cover, as explained above,27 rules that implement ordering principles of the 
respective national social security system in contrast to rules that only relate to the 
control of the overall expenses of a national social security system. In the context of 
UBS, ordering principles refer, amongst others, to the way of how national UBS is 
financed (by contributions or by taxes). Setting minimum requirements for the way of 
how national UBS are financed appears therefore to be excluded from the scope of Article 
153(2)(b) TFEU, but is also not necessary for the establishment of a EUBS. A closer look 
has to be taken at eligibility criteria. Eligibility criteria that implement ordering principles 
of the NUBS are excluded from an EU legal act defining minimum requirements. 
However, eligibility criteria and other rules that do not relate to ordering principles of the 
NUBS but rather serve the control of the overall expenses of the NUBS may still be 
addressed by a Union legal act.  
In order to illustrate this distinction, an eligibility criterion that relates to the ordering 
principles would be the exclusion of self-employed people since the question of whether 
unemployment benefits are to be paid to self-employed people that, by definition, 
decided to bear social risks themselves is rather a matter of principle than of managing 
expenses.  
Regulating part-time workers, on the contrary, rather belongs to criteria relating to the 
management of expenses than to fundamental principles. Part-time workers are under all 
unemployment benefit schemes eligible for unemployment benefits.28 Their actual 
entitlement depends on criteria such as the minimum required contribution or work 
record in weeks, months or hours. A different treatment of part-time workers with regard 
to unemployment benefits amongst Member States can against this background rather 
be traced back to rules relating to the management of expenses such as the work record 
based on hours than ordering principles. This finding is supported by Leschke who 
concluded in her study on the unemployment insurance systems in Europe and their 
adaptation to ‘new risks arising from non-standard employment’: ‘The countries’ 
differences in coverage rates among non-standard workers are driven by differences in 
overall coverage levels rather than by specific principles such as tax financing or the 
                                                 
27 See section 2.2.5.2.2. 
28 Leschke, Are unemployment insurance systems in Europe adapting to news risks arising from 
nonstandard employment?, Working paper No. 07-05.RS (2007), p. 15 et seqq.; OECD, 
Employment Outlook 2010, Chapter 4, How Good is Part-Time Work?, p. 211 et seqq. 
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predominance of the welfare principle.’29 Regulating unemployment benefits for part-time 
workers falls therefore within the scope of minimum requirements that can be set by the 
Union legislator without affecting the Member States’ right to define the fundamental 
principles of their social security systems. 
2.2.5.3.3 Minimum requirements for activation policies 
Furthermore, it might be considered to introduce minimum requirements for activation 
policies under Article 153(2)(b) TFEU. As explained in Task 1A, ‘they can be motivated 
predominantly by concern for individual and institutional moral hazard (Belgium is a 
telling case), but their motivation can also be broader, encompassing the quality of social 
rights for citizens (Austria is an example).’ Minimum requirements play a role in Denmark 
and Austria (with regard to both UI activation and SA activation), in Belgium (with regard 
to UI activation), and in the US (with regard to UI and SA); however, the level of detail 
and the strictness of these requirements differs from case to case. Such minimum 
requirements can be the result of specific inter-institutional agreements (as in Belgium, 
with regard to activation), or of a consensus established among the lower level 
governments (as in the Swiss case, with the non-binding guidelines issued by the inter-
cantonal cooperation conference). 
In order to address issues of institutional and individual moral hazard, it might be 
considered to adopt minimum requirements for activation policies on the basis of Article 
153(2)(b) TFEU. Activation policies are, as can be seen in the explanations of Task 1A, an 
important element relating to the social protection of workers since it addresses a moral 
hazard issue that is inherent to multi-tier unemployment benefit schemes. Yet, it is 
important to recall that minimum requirements can only be adopted on the basis of 
Article 153(2)(b) TFEU if they contribute to the ‘social security and social protection of 
workers’ (Article 153(1)(c) TFEU). Activation policies are, however, rather part of 
employment policies than of social security and protection policies. As such, activation 
policies would have to be based on competences in title IX of the TFEU on employment 
(Articles 145 to 150 TFEU). Title IX of the TFEU does only provide for coordinating 
competences (Article 2(3), 5(2) TFEU) but not for competences for the adoption of legally 
binding acts.  
This does not imply, however, that, based on Article 153(2)(b) TFEU, no minimum 
requirements for activation policies may be adopted at all. In the context of the internal 
market harmonisation competence in Article 114(1) TFEU, the CJEU decided that 
provisions in a legal act, which were chosen on grounds that fall in the scope of another 
policy field than ‘internal market’, do not prevent the use of Article 114(1) TFEU for the 
entire legal act ‘provided that the conditions for recourse to [Article 114(1) TFEU] as a 
legal basis are fulfilled’.30 In fulfilling the conditions for recourse to Article 114(1) TFEU, 
the Union legislator may adopt provision, which it deems necessary ‘for contributing to 
the implementation of a process of harmonisation’.31 The idea underlying this reasoning 
can be generalised and applied to other legal bases. Rules that are necessary to achieve 
the main objective of a harmonising measure may be included in this act although the 
                                                 
29 Leschke, Are unemployment insurance systems in Europe adapting to news risks arising from 
nonstandard employment?, Working paper No. 07-05.RS (2007), p. 32. 
30 CJEU, Case C-376/98, Germany v Parliament and Council [2000] ECR I-8419 para. 88; Case C-
491/01, British American Tobacco (Investments) and Imperial Tobacco [2002] ECR I-11453 
para. 62; Case C-380/03, Germany v Parliament and Council [2006] ECR I-11573 para. 39; 
Case C-58/08, Vodafone [2010] I-4999 para. 36. 
31 CJEU, Case C-217/04, United Kingdom v Parliament and Council [2006] ECR I-3771 para. 44; 
Case C-270/12, United Kingdom v Parliament and Council, ECLI:EU:C:2014:18, para. 104 et 
seq. 
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subject-matter of these particular rules falls into the scope of another policy field than 
the one of the competence, on which the harmonising measure is based. In order to 
prevent a circumvention of the distribution of competences between Member States and 
the Union and the limits set to Union competences by the Treaties, complementing rules 
falling in the scope of other policy areas than the one of the invoked competence have in 
fact to pursue the objectives of harmonising measure.32  
Applying this reasoning to Article 153(2)(b) TFEU and the question of setting minimum 
requirements for activation policies, the conclusion would be that minimum requirements 
for activation policies, although they would fall into the scope of title IX of the TFEU on 
employment policies, could be adopted on the basis of Article 153(2)(b) TFEU provided 
that they are necessary for the social security and social protection of workers under 
Article 153(1)(c) TFEU.  
Against this background, Article 153(2)(b) TFEU can, in principle, be used for the 
adoption of minimum requirements for activation policies in relation to the objective set 
out in Article 153(1)(c) TFEU. Activation policies covered by such a legal act must in fact 
pursue the objective of social security and social protection of workers. Minimum 
requirements for activation policies that appear to be politically important but rather 
remote with regard to social security and social protection of workers may not be based 
on Article 153(2)(b) TFEU. They must either be included in guidelines coordinating 
Member States’ employment policies under Article 148(2) TFEU or in a Council 
recommendation based on Article 292 TFEU.33 It should be noted that these instruments 
are not legally binding upon the Member States. 
With regard to those minimum requirements on activation policies that are necessary for 
the social security and social protection of workers under Article 153(1)(c) TFEU, Article 
153(2)(b) TFEU would be a suitable legal base since these minimum requirements would 
not concern the fundamental principles of the social security system of the Member 
States as they do not affect the ordering principles of social security. The costs attached 
to activation policies do, furthermore, not significantly affect the financial equilibrium of 
the social security systems of the Member States. Because of the required nexus with 
minimum requirements for the social security and social protection of workers, however, 
it should be noted that probably only few elements of effective activation policies can be 
harmonised on the basis of Article 153(2)(b) TFEU.34 
2.2.6 Specific actions to strengthen social cohesion (Article 175(3) TFEU) 
The use of Article 175(3) TFEU for the establishment of a EUBS was suggested by few 
authors and institutions.35 This provision is part of Title XVIII on economic, social and 
territorial cohesion. It was used inter alia for the establishment of the European 
                                                 
32 In this sense CJEU, Case C-376/98, Germany v Parliament and Council [2000] ECR I-8419 para. 
85. 
33 An example for such a recommendation in the area of activation policies based on Article 292 
TFEU can be found in Council Recommendation of 22 April 2013 on establishing a Youth 
Guarantee, [2013] OJ C 120, p. 1. 
34 On the impact of this limited use of setting legally binding minimum requirements for activation 
policies on the basis of Article 153(2)(b) TFEU on the limits set by the ‘no bail-out clause’ in 
Article 125(1) TFEU, cf. section 3. 
35 Proposed by Iliadou, Karakitsos and Tsibanoulis, in: Neergard/Jacqueson/Danielsen (eds.), The 
XXVI FIDE Congress in Copenhagen 2014 Congress Publications Vol. 1, The Economic and 
Monetary Union, Report on Greece, p. 376-418 at 379; Ministero dell’Economia e delle Finanze, 
European unemployment insurance scheme (October 2015), p. 3. 
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Globalisation Adjustment Fund.36 This legal base allows for the establishment of 
specialised funds at EU level that lead to the strengthening of the social cohesion in the 
Union. A Union fund is detached from any national rules and defines its eligibility criteria 
autonomously. By that, Article 175(3) TFEU addresses some of the features that couldn’t 
be realised on the basis of the Union competences examined previously. 
2.2.6.1 Scope of Article 175(3) TFEU 
The European Parliament and the Council may, in accordance with the ordinary legislative 
procedure, adopt on the basis of Article 175(3) TFEU ‘specific actions outside the Funds’ 
if necessary to attain the objective set out in Article 174 TFEU, which is the strengthening 
of the economic, social and territorial cohesion of the Union.37 According to the CJEU, the 
content of a specific action adopted on the basis of Article 175(3) TFEU may not ‘extend 
beyond the scope of the Community’s policy on economic and social cohesion’.38 
Therefore, the scope of the legal base in Article 175(3) TFEU follows the scope of Article 
174 TFEU defining the Union’s policy on economic, social and territorial cohesion. The 
definition of the scope of Article 174 TFEU with regard to strengthening social cohesion 
meets with two obstacles: First, the question arises whether ‘social cohesion’ can be 
considered as stand-alone objective amongst ‘economic, social and territorial cohesion’, 
which is not reduced to addressing only region-specific social problems. Second, and 
more important, the term ‘social cohesion’ gives little guidance as to which kind of 
measures are suitable for promoting social cohesion. The term must therefore be defined 
more concretely in order to make it accessible for an assessment of the suitability of 
Article 175(3) TFEU to adopt a given measure. 
2.2.6.1.1 Strengthening social cohesion beyond addressing region-specific 
problems 
Article 3(3)(3) TEU defines the objective, according to which the Union ‘shall promote 
economic, social and territorial cohesion, and solidarity among Member States.’ Article 
175(3) TFEU implements this objective. A question may now arise whether the objective 
to promote ‘social cohesion’ can be understood as a stand-alone objective or has to be 
read together with economic and territorial cohesion as one goal so that a Union measure 
may only promote social cohesion if it also strengthens the economic and territorial 
cohesion. The latter understanding would reduce the cohesion objective to one that only 
allows for addressing region-specific disparities and not Union-wide disparities as a EUBS 
would do. 
Whilst the wording of ‘economic, social and territorial cohesion’ and the use of the word 
‘and’ might speak in favour of a narrow understanding of the cohesion goal as only 
addressing region-specific disparities, the better arguments are in favour of interpreting 
the promotion of social cohesion as a stand-alone objective. This can, first, be drawn 
from the fact that until the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, territorial cohesion, 
which explicitly addresses region-specific disparities, was not even mentioned in the 
Treaties. Article 2, first indent of the TEU of 2006 defined hence as objective of the Union 
‘to promote economic and social progress […], in particular […] through the 
strengthening of economic and social cohesion’.  
                                                 
36 Regulation (EU) No 1309/2013 of 17 December 2013 on the European Globalisation Adjustment 
Fund (2014-2020) and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1927/2006, [2013] OJ L 347, p. 855. 
37 CJEU, Case C-166/07, European Parliament v Council [2009] ECR I-7135 para. 45. 
38 CJEU, Case C-166/07, European Parliament v Council [2009] ECR I-7135 para. 46. 
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Furthermore, a closer look at the articles specifying the cohesion goal in the TFEU reveals 
that an understanding of the cohesion goal as only addressing region-specific disparities 
curtails the reach of this goal as it is meant by the Treaties. Article 174(2) TFEU states 
that when strengthening its economic, social and territorial cohesion ‘[i]n particular, the 
Union shall aim at reducing disparities between the levels of development of the various 
regions and the backwardness of the least favoured regions.’39 The reference to ‘in 
particular’ makes clear that the cohesion goal also includes measure that do not aim at 
reducing disparities between regions, but economic and social disparities. This finding is 
supported by secondary Union legislation. Regulation (EU) No 1304/2013 on the 
European Social Fund40 seeks, according to its second recital, ‘to improve employment 
opportunities, strengthen social inclusion, fight poverty, promote education, skills and 
life-long learning and develop active, comprehensive and sustainable inclusion policies in 
accordance with the tasks entrusted to the ESF by Article 162 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), and thereby contribute to economic, social 
and territorial cohesion in accordance with Article 174 TFEU’.41 This shows that an 
instrument such as the ESF, which primarily aims at reducing social disparities, is 
covered by the objective of promoting ‘economic, social and territorial cohesion’. 
Moreover, the most prominent specific action adopted on the basis of Article 175(3) 
TFEU, the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund (EGF),42 also extends its scope 
beyond region-specific problems. Whereas the original regulation43 defined its scope in 
Article 1(1) as providing ‘support for workers made redundant as a result of major 
structural changes in world trade patterns due to globalisation where these redundancies 
have a significant adverse impact on the regional or local economy’,44 already three years 
later as a reaction to the outbreak of the economic and financial crisis the Union 
legislator, based on the same legal basis, dropped the regional limitation and included 
Article 1(1a): ‘By way of derogation from paragraph 1, the EGF shall also provide support 
to workers made redundant as a direct result of the global financial and economic crisis 
[…]. Member States applying for an EGF contribution under this derogation shall establish 
a direct and demonstrable link between the redundancies and the financial and economic 
crisis.’45 This derogation can also be found in Article 2(b) of the current Regulation (EU) 
No 1309/2013 specifying that the derogation may also be applied ‘as a result of a new 
global financial and economic crisis’. Furthermore, the Union legislator, based on Article 
175(3) TFEU, extended the geographical point of reference for the ‘significant adverse 
impact’ of the redundancies in Article 2(a) to ‘the local, regional and national economy.’46 
Including the impact on the national economy shows that promoting ‘economic, social 
and territorial cohesion’ is to be understood as going beyond addressing region-specific 
problems. The main purpose of the EGF is ‘to show solidarity towards workers made 
redundant as a result of major structural changes in world trade patterns due to 
                                                 
39 Emphasis added. 
40 [2013] OJ L 347, p. 470. 
41 Emphasis added. 
42 Regulation (EU) No 1309/2013 of 17 December 2013 on the European Globalisation Adjustment 
Fund (2014-2020) and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1927/2006, [2013] OJ L 347, p. 855. 
43 Regulation (EC) No 1927/2006 on establishing the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund, 
[2006] OJ L 406, p. 1. 
44 Emphasis added. 
45 Article 1(1) of Regulation (EC) No 546/2009 amending Regulation (EC) No 1927/2006 on 
establishing the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund, [2009] OJ L 167, p. 26.  
46 Emphasis added. 
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globalisation and global financial and economic crises’47 and, by that, to primarily achieve 
social cohesion. 
Finally, Article 174(1) TFEU specifies that the Union should strengthen the economic, 
social and territorial cohesion ‘[i]n order to promote its overall harmonious development’. 
This reference to the overall development clarifies that positive effects of the means 
adopted in order to strengthen the economic, social and territorial cohesion must be 
measurable at EU level. In other words, measures that improve the overall development 
of the Union are covered by the cohesion goal even if they involve EU wide activities. 
From this perspective, it appears difficult to argue that ‘social cohesion’ could not be 
pursued by the Union legislator as a stand-alone objective and policy action must be 
limited to addressing region-specific problems. Against the background of these 
arguments, the Union legislator may adopt measures that primarily aim at promoting 
social cohesion as a part of the objective to strengthen economic, social and territorial 
cohesion without being limited to only addressing region-specific problems. 
2.2.6.1.2 Meaning of ‘social cohesion’ 
After having clarified that a specific action based on Article 175(3) TFEU may be adopted 
in order to promote social cohesion without being limited to only focus on region-specific 
problems, the question has to be addressed what kind of policy measures are covered by 
the notion of ‘cohesion’. As mentioned above, there is wide range of possible 
understandings of the broad notions of ‘economic, social and territorial cohesion’. 
Advocate General Bot therefore concluded that the ‘protean nature of economic and 
social cohesion and the general nature of the tasks given to that policy mean that it is 
difficult to define it exactly. It thus proves difficult to lay down the limits of the area 
covered by the policy because economic and social cohesion emerges as a broad overall 
concept with imprecise contours.’48 The Court realised earlier that ‘although […] the 
strengthening of economic and social cohesion is one of the objectives of the Community 
and, consequently, constitutes an important factor, in particular for the interpretation of 
Community law in the economic and social sphere, the provisions in question merely lay 
down a programme, so that the implementation of the objective of economic and social 
cohesion must be the result of the policies and actions of the Community and also of the 
Member States.’49 In brief, the definition of what is covered by economic, social and 
territorial cohesion falls within the political sphere and is therefore to be made by the 
Union together with the Member States.50  
This broadest possible understanding of the scope of ‘economic, social and territorial 
cohesion’ was confirmed by the Court in its judgment in the IFI case concerning the 
financial contributions of the former European Community to the ‘International Fund for 
Ireland’ (IFI). This fund was established on the basis of an agreement between the 
governments of Ireland and the United Kingdom51 and had as objectives to promote 
economic and social advance and to encourage contact, dialogue and reconciliation 
between nationalists and unionists throughout Ireland. The IFI forms an international 
organisation with legal personality, which is administered by a board composed by 
                                                 
47 Recital 2. 
48 AG Bot, Case C-166/07, European Parliament v Council [2009] I-7135 no. 82. 
49 CJEU, Case C-149/96, Portugal v Council [1999] ECR I-8395, para. 86. 
50 Kern and Eggers consider Article 175(3) TFEU therefore also as a ‘subsidiary competence’ for 
cohesion policy (‘Auffangkompetenz’), in: Grabitz, Hilf and Nettesheim, Das Recht der 
Europäischen Union, 2015, Artikel 175 AEUV para. 21. 
51 United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 1515, No I-26244. 
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representatives of Ireland and the United Kingdom. The former European Community’s 
financial contribution to the IFI was adopted by means of a regulation on the basis of 
former Article 308 EC (today’s Article 352 TFEU). The European Parliament contested the 
choice of the legal base and argued that former Article 159(3) EC (today’s Article 175(3) 
TFEU) would have been the correct legal base. The Court found, without rejecting the 
above cited reasoning of Advocate General Bot in his conclusions regarding this case, 
that the financing of the IFI and, by that, the support of its objectives is covered by 
‘economic and social coherence’.52  
Academia criticises the lack of a clear definition of the term ‘social cohesion’.53 This lack 
of clear definition reveals the main weakness of this term. It is only understood as an 
element that opens the scope of application of Articles 174, 175 TFEU rather than limits 
it. Yet, the term can only be considered useful for the definition of the scope of a legal 
provision if it not only provides for criteria opening the scope of this provision but also for 
those limiting it. Molle suggests to define cohesion as ‘the degree to which disparities in 
social and economic welfare between different regions or groups within the European 
Union are politically and socially tolerable’.54 Whether cohesion is achieved is to be 
observed by looking at the changes in disparities from one period to another. 
Strengthening cohesion means, in this context, a decrease of disparity.55 Disparity is then 
measured on the basis of ‘indicators to describe the actual situation and its development 
over time’.56 The indicators are selected against the background of the policy field, in 
which disparity is not ‘politically and socially tolerable’. The decision whether disparities 
are ‘politically and socially tolerable’ has a procedural and a substantive dimension. In 
procedural terms the Member States in the Council decide when adopting a specific 
action whether they consider certain disparities as not being tolerable anymore. That was 
what the CJEU meant when referring to ‘the implementation of the objective of economic 
and social cohesion’ as the ‘result of the policies and actions of the Community and also 
of the Member States.’57 In substantive terms, disparities are politically and socially 
intolerable if they cannot effectively be reduced by policy action only at the level of 
Member States. Here the definition of ‘social cohesion’ meets the principle of subsidiarity. 
Against this definition, a Union policy action leading to the strengthening of social 
cohesion requires, first, the identification of social disparities between different regions or 
groups within the EU that are politically and socially intolerable. In order to be based on 
Article 175(3) TFEU, a specific action must, second, be suitable to reduce the identified 
disparities. It is worth mentioning at this point that the geographical point of reference is 
the entire EU and not a single Member State or region. Article 174(1) TFEU refers to the 
Union’s ‘overall harmonious development’.  
Whilst the scope of ‘social cohesion’ can hence be interpreted broadly, a specific action 
on the basis of Article 175(3) TFEU must, furthermore, be ‘necessary outside the Funds’. 
It is worth mentioning at that point that ‘the Funds’ not only mean funds established 
within Title XVIII of the TFEU but all financial support programmes that are foreseen in 
the Treaties (such as e.g. the European Social Fund) provided that these programmes 
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53 Molle, European Cohesion Policy, 2007, p. 5, 60. 
54 Molle, European Cohesion Policy, 2007, p. 5. 
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2007, p.16. 
56 Molle, European Cohesion Policy, 2007, p. 61. 
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contribute to the strengthening of the economic, social and territorial cohesion.58 The 
reference in Article 175(3) TFEU to ‘the Funds’ can be understood in two ways: It can be 
a limiting criterion, which requires that the subject matter of the specific action has to fall 
within the nexus of the Funds. That is the case when the specific action supports the 
usage of the Funds or when the subject matter of the specific action falls, in principle, 
within the scope of the policies pursued by the Funds but concerns only an exceptional 
situation. Such a limiting understanding of the reference to the Funds is supported by the 
actual use of Article 175(3) TFEU. It was used in order to adopt Regulation (EU) No 
1309/2013 on the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund, which can be used in order 
to mitigate negative effects of ‘major structural changes in world trade patterns due to 
globalisation’, and to adopt Council Regulation (EC) No 2012/2002 establishing the 
European Union Solidarity Fund, which can be used in order to mitigate the costs of 
major natural disasters. It was also used for the adoption of Regulation (EC) No 
1082/2006 on a European grouping of territorial cooperation (EGTC), which supports 
cross-border territorial cooperation. To pursue a different policy by the specific action 
than the ones pursued by the Funds would, following this understanding, exceed the 
limits of the legal base of Article 175(3) TFEU. 
In the alternative reading, the reference to the Funds still allows the Union legislator, 
when adopting specific actions, to pursue other policies than the ones pursued by the 
Funds but requires that the specific actions must serve strengthening the economic and 
social cohesion of the Union. In its judgment in the IFI case, the CJEU appears to follow 
this interpretation: ‘It is, admittedly, true that [Article 175(3) TFEU] does not set out the 
form which such specific actions can take. However, […] the Community, through all of 
its actions, implements an independent Community policy, with the result that Title XVII 
of the EC Treaty [Title XVIII of the TFEU] provides adequate legal bases allowing for the 
adoption of means of action which are specific to the Community, […] the content of 
which does not extend beyond the scope of the Community’s policy on economic and 
social cohesion.’59  
The Union may therefore and following the case law of the CJEU, based on Article 175(3) 
TFEU, pursue a different policy than the one pursued by the Funds as long as it is 
covered by the scope of ‘social cohesion’. 
2.2.6.2 Limits of Article 175(3) TFEU 
2.2.6.2.1 Limited geographical scope of the specific action 
It could be argued that specific actions adopted under Article 175(3) TFEU have to cover 
the entire territory of the Union and cannot be limited to a particular area within the 
Union territory such as e.g. the Euro area. As, however, Advocate General Bot correctly 
pointed out in his opinion in the IFI case concerning financial contributions to support 
activities in Ireland, ‘there is nothing in the wording of that article that rules out specific 
action for the benefit of one or more regions of the Community. In addition, if the 
Community’s economic and social cohesion policy is regarded as a device for restoring a 
balance in order to promote convergence between the regions of the Community, it is 
perfectly logical that the Community should selectively focus its action on regions which 
manifest certain economic and social imbalances.’60 Hence, specific actions based on 
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Article 175(3) TFEU may be limited, if politically necessary, to a subgroup of Member 
States in the Union. 
2.2.6.2.2 Use of financial means provided under a specific action must be 
approved by Union institutions 
In the IFI case, the CJEU came to the final conclusion that the financial contributions of 
the Union to the IFI could not only be based on former Article 159(3) EC, although the 
objectives of the contested regulation would allow to legislate on its basis. The Court 
required in addition to the objectives that must fall within the scope of ‘economic and 
social convergence’ that specific actions based on former Article 159(3) EC have to be 
‘administered in accordance with the Community regulatory framework’.61 Since the 
subsequent use of the financial contributions of the Union to the IFI was exclusively 
decided by the IFI Board, which was only composed by representatives of Ireland and the 
United Kingdom, and, by that, to the exclusion of the former European Community, the 
latter was not in a position ‘to prevent the use by the Fund of that contribution to cover 
actions which, while complying with the objectives of the IFI Agreement, extend beyond 
the scope of the Community’s policy on economic and social cohesion or, at least, are not 
managed in accordance with the criteria applied by the Community within the framework 
of that policy.’62 This lack of a procedural influence of the former European Community 
on the decision about the actual use of the financial contributions lead to the conclusion 
of the Court that such contributions may not only be based on former Article 159(3) EC 
but in conjunction with former Article 308 EC. Against this background, the 
‘administration in accordance with the Community regulatory framework’ set a limit for 
the use of Article 175(3) TFEU. This condition is met if the specific action provides for a 
definition of how the financial means provided by it are subsequently used and foresee 
for the European Union a possibility to raise a veto against activities financed by it, which 
would go beyond the scope of ‘economic and social convergence’. 
2.2.6.2.3 No undermining of limits set by other legal bases 
Finally, legislating on the basis of Article 175(3) TFEU may not undermine limits set by 
other legal bases. In contrast to Article 352(1) TFEU, Article 175(3) TFEU is not designed 
as a flexibility clause, which may be used in order to compensate for limitations set by 
other Union legal bases. It therefore may not overrule such limitations. This refers in 
particular to the constitutional saving clauses in the Treaties. Such constitutional saving 
clauses can inter alia be found in Article 153(4) and (5) TFEU. Against this background, 
specific actions under Article 175(3) TFEU may not affect the right of the Member States 
to define the fundamental principles of their social security systems, must not 
significantly affect the financial equilibrium thereof and should not apply to pay. Read 
altogether, these constitutional saving clauses aim at shielding the national social 
security systems as part of the core of Member States’ sovereignty against unreasonable 
influence of European legislation. Yet, the Union is not entirely excluded from adopting 
rules on social security. The existence of Article 151 and 153 TFEU illustrate that the 
Union legislator is entitled to adopt provisions that affect national security systems. 
These provisions have, however, to be adopted unanimously in the Council, which allows 
each Member State to raise a veto if it considers the Union measure to be too intrusive 
into the area of social security.  
Against this background, specific actions, which under Article 175(3) TFEU require a 
qualified majority in order to be adopted in the Council, may not be of such a kind to 
influence national social security systems as if they set minimum requirements. As such, 
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it would undermine the majority requirements for adopting legislation that may set 
minimum requirements under Article 153 TFEU and allow for Union influence on national 
social security law beyond the overall limits set by the Treaties in order to shield this core 
area of Member States’ sovereignty against European influence. 
2.2.6.3 Article 175(3) TFEU as a legal base for EUBS? 
2.2.6.3.1 EUBS as a means to promote social cohesion 
The answer to the core question whether a EUBS could be based on Article 175(3) TFEU 
depends on the extent to which a EUBS strengthens the ‘social cohesion’.  
Social cohesion is understood at hand as the decrease of social disparities between 
different regions or groups within the EU that are politically and socially intolerable. 
Disparities are defined on the basis of indicators, which are selected against the 
background of the policy field, in which cohesion is to be achieved at EU level. With 
regard to EUBS the indicators are to be derived from the policy field relating to 
unemployment. The main indicators are the unemployment rate, the quality of 
unemployment (which refers to the level of education of unemployed people) and the 
quality of social protection (which refers to the amount of social benefits paid to the 
eligible person and to social benefits as a percentage of GDP).63 A closer look at these 
indicators and their development over time64 reveal the disparities in the area of 
unemployment and an increase of these disparities. 
Disparities must, furthermore, be politically and socially intolerable. This element of the 
definition of ‘social cohesion’ has, as explained above in section 2.2.6.1, a procedural and 
a substantive dimension. In procedural terms, there would be a presumption that 
disparities are politically and socially intolerable when the Council adopts a specific action 
with the necessary majority. The legislator and the Member States have in this respect a 
political prerogative to determine whether disparities are tolerable 
(‘Einschätzungsprärogative’).  Moreover, in substantive terms, the identified disparities in 
relation to unemployment cannot effectively be reduced at the level of the Member 
States. Besides a procedural presumption that disparities are politically and socially 
intolerable when adopting specific actions with the necessary majority in the Council, 
there is a substantive presumption that the disparities cannot effectively be reduced at 
Member States level when there is an increase in disparities before the adoption of a 
specific action. Such increase allows for the conclusion that, assuming Member States 
intend to take necessary policy action at their level to fight increasing disparities, 
Member States are not effectively in a position to reduce disparities. This is, with regard 
to unemployment, especially true for Member States that are in a currency union. Since 
monetary policy instruments and, by that, nominal devaluation is not anymore at the 
disposal of a Member States to compensate for macroeconomic imbalances, it must 
employ policies of real devaluation, which lead to increased unemployment and the costs 
attached to it.65 By that, Member States that are hit by an asymmetric shock are less in a 
position to reduce disparities than the European level.66 In sum, the identified disparities 
in relation to unemployment can be considered politically and socially intolerable. 
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As a next step, in order to be based on Article 175(3) TFEU, a EUBS must be suitable to 
reduce the identified disparities within the EU. In principle, the goal of a EUBS is not per 
se to reduce disparities relating to unemployment. It is an automatic stabiliser designed 
to cushion European national economies in case of negative shocks. Moreover, the 
system targets short-term unemployment. In other words, it is designed to smooth 
cycles and will not affect structural differences between economies, such as long-term 
unemployment rates. In particular, the equivalent systems focus on the macroeconomic 
stabilisation effect since they only apply in case the trigger is activated and since they 
include only transfers from a European fund to national budgets. Notably having regard 
to the indicator of the quality of social protection, one has to acknowledge that 
equivalent EUBS only have an impact on the quality of social protection in times of 
economic crises. Moreover, equivalent EUBS prevent only a further increase of disparities 
when an economic crisis hits a Member State.67 In order to be considered strengthening 
social cohesion, however, a Union measure must achieve a decrease of disparities. This 
shows that the aspect of social cohesion is only of minor importance for equivalent EUBS, 
whilst the focus is on macroeconomic stabilisation. The equivalent EUBS options may 
therefore, in principle, not be based on Article 175(3) TFEU. 
Turning to the genuine EUBS options, the relationship between macroeconomic 
stabilisation and social cohesion turns around. Whilst these EUBS options also have a 
macroeconomic stabilisation effect as they discharge national budgets from paying 
unemployment benefits also in crisis’ times, they primarily aim at reducing disparities 
when it comes to short-term unemployment as they pay out a European benefit directly 
to the unemployed eligible person. By that, they appear, in principle, to be suitable to 
strengthen social cohesion. 
A closer look at the impact of the several genuine EUBS options on the indicators that 
define the disparities over time such as the coverage rate of the total amount of short-
term unemployed people, the employment, the unemployment rate or the quality of 
social protection reveals that many genuine EUBS options actually reduce disparities.  
The backward-looking analysis by Dolls and Lewney shows with regard to the coverage 
rate of EUBS of short-term unemployed people as compared to NUBS that most of the 
variants lead to a higher coverage rate than the national unemployment insurances.68 
The only exception is variant V8, which is linked to the fact that this EUBS variant only 
covers the period between the third and the sixth month of unemployment. As regards 
the impact on employment, their analysis finds that all genuine EUBS variants have a 
more positive outcome than the situation, in which only national unemployment 
insurance are in place.69 Concerning the unemployment rate, the effect of EUBS in 
comparison to stand-alone NUBS is only very small and calculated at +/- 0.05 
percentage points.70 
The indicator of the quality of social protection is discussed by Coucheir, Strban and 
Hauben in the horizontal report on the legal and operational feasibility of the EUBS at 
national level.71 This follows from the fact that because of the co-existence of EUBS and 
NUBS in the territory of the Member States (see section 2.2.1) a higher level of EUBS 
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benefits as compared to national benefits results into an easier implementation of EUBS 
in the Member States since the national unemployment insurance would not have to top 
up EUBS.72 The authors correctly point out that a comparison of EUBS and NUBS 
amounts is ‘extremely complex’ and goes beyond ‘a simple comparison of the 
replacement rates of the EUBS benefits and NUBS benefits’.73 This is due to the fact that 
an EUBS with lower replacement rate as compared to the one of the national 
unemployment insurance can still reduce disparities because of a more generous 
determination of reference earnings or capping. Despite this correct analysis one may 
already discard variant V9 from the ones that might be suitable to reduce disparities as it 
has a replacement rate of only 35%, which can only be found in few national system 
such as the Croatian one. The vast majority of NUBS is above this replacement rate. It is 
worth mentioning that variant V9 with a low replacement rate but a high capping at 
150% favours, in particular, high-income earners over low-income earners. Furthermore, 
variant V14 referring to a capping of 50% can also be discarded as this low capping leads 
to lower unemployment benefits in most of the Member States and corresponds de facto 
to a flat-rate provision for above-average earners.74 Variant V14 would therefore 
generate frequently top-ups by NUBS, which proves that it is not suitable to reduce 
current disparities. 
Finally, EUBS has an indirect effect on reducing disparities, which are due to the 
significant differences between the various national unemployment schemes in place. If 
the eligibility criteria, the amount or the duration of the European unemployment benefit 
are more generous than the ones under the NUBS, the necessary takeover of the eligible 
person by the NUBS after the expiry of the European benefit could trigger a convergence 
in the design of national unemployment benefit schemes. By the time the EUBS expires 
(which is in most of the EUBS variants the 12th month of unemployment), the 
unemployed worker will be again in the hands of the national unemployment benefit 
schemes. This will lead to a jump that, depending on the country, is more or less large 
and entails that a worker is entitled to lower benefits (if not zero). Moreover, in many 
national systems unemployed workers would fall back on social assistance (or first on 
unemployment insurance and then on social assistance). This jump is an undesirable 
outcome, from the economic as well as from the administrative point of view. While the 
EU cannot force countries to adjust their systems, one can easily imagine that the 
creation of a EUBS can put in place a convergence of national schemes towards the 
European one in order to smooth the transition between the safety net of the European 
scheme and their own.  
In sum, the arguments put forward show that genuine EUBS will reduce disparities in 
relation to unemployment within the European Union and, by that, strengthen social 
cohesion. The variants V8, V9 and V14, however, have to be excluded as they won’t 
reduce the overall disparities. By that, the remaining variants of genuine EUBS can be 
considered to fall under the broad understanding of the notion of ‘social cohesion’ of the 
European Court of Justice. These genuine EUBS variants may therefore be established on 
the basis of Article 175(3) TFEU. 
Finally, it is worth mentioning that a nucleus of a genuine EUBS can already be found in 
EU law in the shape of the European Globalisation Fund (EGF), established by Regulation 
(EU) No 1309/2013 on the basis of Article 175(3) TFEU. Beneficiaries of this fund are 
‘worker whose employment is ended prematurely by redundancy’. The regulation defines 
the eligibility for and the content of the support granted by this fund. In contrast to 
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73 Coucheir/Strban and Hauben, Report on Task 2B, 3.2.3.2. 
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genuine EUBS, payments by the EGF are authorised on a discretionary basis, whilst 
payments by EUBS are automatized. This refers, however, to a technicality, which is not 
required by the legal base itself. 
2.2.6.3.2 No undermining of limitations contained in other legal bases 
Yet, a specific action adopted under Article 175(3) TFEU may not undermine limitations, 
which the Treaties included into other Union legal bases. These limitations can be 
substantive such as constitutional saving clauses or procedural such as a unanimous 
voting requirement instead of a qualified majority voting requirement. Genuine EUBS 
take, within the scope of its application, precedence over NUBS (see section 2.2.1). 
Outside its scope of application, as just shown, EUBS will affect the national UBS in a way 
that it sets incentives for an adaptation of national UBS to the EUBS in terms of 
eligibility, duration or replacement rate in order to smoothen the transition between 
EUBS and national UBS. Against this background, EUBS has two impacts on the social 
protection of workers within the territory of a Member States.  
First, within its own scope of application, it competes against the NUBS and takes 
precedence over the latter. If EUBS is now more generous than NUBS, frictions may 
occur with regard to the NUBS that regulated before the establishment of EUBS 
exclusively the unemployment benefits within the national territory. These frictions are, 
however, only a consequence of the co-existence of an EU fund, which has to define the 
conditions of its eligibility itself, and of a national fund, which also has to define the 
conditions of its eligibility itself. These frictions do not affect the ‘the right of Member 
States to define the fundamental principles of their social security systems’, as 
guaranteed by Article 154(4), first indent TFEU. Member States are still free to define 
their national social security systems. There are only not applicable anymore within the 
scope of application of EUBS. The danger of undermining Member States’ sovereignty, 
which is the underlying rationale of Article 153(4), first indent TFEU, is not at stake when 
the Union establishes an own fund. Political responsibilities for the activities of this fund 
are clearly visible and assigned to the Union legislator. 
Second and more important, outside its scope of application, a EUBS will probably 
achieve de facto convergence of national UBS. In situations, in which the NUBS is outside 
the scope of EUBS less generous than the EUBS, previous claimants under the EUBS, 
who after the transition from the EUBS to the NUBS won’t be covered by a benefit at all 
anymore or who will receive less than under the EUBS, will certainly increase political 
pressure on national governments to adapt the national UBS. Moreover, the additional 
costs attached to the administration of different unemployment benefit schemes by the 
national unemployment authorities will prompt the national legislator to consider an 
adaptation of the NUBS to the EUBS. 
This de facto convergence goes beyond economic convergence and might result into a 
legal adaption of the national UBS rules.75 The co-existence of genuine EUBS and NUBS 
might against this background have, in political and in economic terms, a de facto 
harmonising effect on NUBS, which is still below legal harmonisation but not that remote 
from it to disregard the limitations set by Article 153 TFEU to legal harmonisation in the 
area of the ‘social security and social protection of workers’. Hence, these limitations 
have to be taken into account when basing genuine EUBS options on Article 175(3) TFEU. 
Under Article 153 TFEU, the Union law may not affect the right of Member States to 
define the fundamental principles of their social security law and the Council has to vote 
unanimously in favour of Commission proposal (see section 2.2.5.2). If a EUBS were to 
be established not as a separate specific action but as a part of national UBS, a Union 
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legal act establishing this EUBS would have to be based on Article 153 TFEU. It appears 
not convincing that the de facto harmonising effect of a separate and independent EUBS 
on NUBS is so much different from the legal harmonisation under Article 153 TFEU that it 
would justify the adoption of a EUBS by qualified majority instead of a unanimity. Against 
this background, establishing the EUBS on the basis of Article 175(3) TFEU appears as 
undermining the limitations contained in Article 153 TFEU. As a consequence, Article 
175(3) TFEU may also not serve as a legal base for the establishment of a genuine EUBS.  
2.3. Legal base for EUBS aiming at macroeconomic stabilisation 
(equivalent EUBS) 
The possible specific legal bases that serve to attain the objective of macroeconomic 
stabilisation are (in numerical order) Article 121(6) TFEU (detailed rules for the 
multilateral surveillance procedure) (2.3.1) and Article 122(2) TFEU (Union financial 
assistance in case of crises) (2.3.2). The meaning of Article 352(1) TFEU in the context of 
macroeconomic stabilisation will be assessed under section 2.4. 
2.3.1 Detailed rules for the multilateral surveillance procedure (Article 121(6) 
TFEU 
The European Parliament and the Council may, in accordance with the ordinary legislative 
procedure, adopt on the basis of Article 121(6) TFEU ‘detailed rules for the multilateral 
surveillance procedures referred to in’ Article 121(3) and (4) TFEU. This legal base was 
proposed by a note of the Italian Ministry for Economic and Financial Affairs.76 One may 
consider Article 121(6) TFEU as a legal base since at least with the adoption of 
Regulation (EU) No 1176/2011 on the prevention and correction of macroeconomic 
imbalances77 macroeconomic stabilisation is an aim pursued by the multilateral 
surveillance procedure under Article 121 TFEU. One may therefore consider to base a 
EUBS, understood as an instrument for macroeconomic stabilisation, on Article 121(6) 
TFEU. 
2.3.1.1 Scope of Article 121(6) TFEU 
Measures based on Article 121(6) TFEU may specify and facilitate the multilateral 
surveillance procedure, as defined by Article 121(3) and (4). The scope of Article 121(6) 
TFEU is therefore defined by the scope of the multilateral surveillance procedure. The 
multilateral surveillance procedure aims at ensuring ‘closer coordination of economic 
policies’ and ‘sustained convergence of the economic performances of the Member 
States’. In order to achieve this effect under the procedure, ‘economic developments in 
each of the Member States and of the Union’ and ‘the consistency of economic policies 
with the broad guidelines’ are to be monitored (Article 121(3) TFEU). Violations, which 
can be addressed under Article 121(4) TFEU, are inconsistencies of a Member State’s 
economic policies with the broad guidelines and the risk of jeopardising the proper 
functioning of the economic and monetary union. The scope of the multilateral 
surveillance procedure is therefore defined, first, by the object of surveillance, which are 
‘economic policies’ and ‘economic performances’ and, second, by the benchmark for the 
surveillance, which is set by the ‘broad guidelines of the economic policies of the Member 
States and of the Union’ (Article 121(2) TFEU) and the ‘proper functioning the economic 
and monetary union’.  
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The Union legislator made use of this legal base when adopting Regulation (EU) No 
1176/2011 on the prevention and correction of macroeconomic imbalances and of 
Regulation (EU) No 1175/2011 amending Council Regulation (EC) No 1466/97 on the 
strengthening of the surveillance of budgetary positions and the surveillance and 
coordination of economic policies. In conjunction with Article 136(1) TFEU, this legal base 
was used in order to introduce the so-called ‘Two Pack’-Regulations for more restrictive 
rules on the economic policy coordination with regard to Member States whose 
currency78 is the Euro and in order to introduce sanction for non-compliance of Member 
States whose currency is the Euro with the economic policy coordination requirements.79 
2.3.1.2 Limits of Article 121(6) TFEU 
The limits of Article 121(6) TFEU are set by the limits of the multilateral surveillance 
procedure being an instrument of policy coordination. Member States shall, according to 
Article 5(1), ‘coordinate their economic policies within the Union’. This coordination 
requires from Member States that they ‘conduct their economic policies […] in the 
context of the broad guidelines referred to in Article 121(2)’ (Article 120 TFEU). Broad 
guidelines are adopted as recommendations (Article 121(2)(3) TFEU), which means, 
according to Article 288(5) TFEU, that they have no binding force. The European 
Commission may, therefore, not enforce broad guidelines, which were not implemented 
by a Member State, in the same manner as it can enforce directives under Article 288(3) 
TFEU in conjunction with Article 4(3) TFEU. Broad guidelines have no direct effect. 
Economic policy coordination is, by definition, not supranational but intergovernmental. 
This fundamental decision by the Treaties may not be changed by means of secondary 
law based on Article 121(6) TFEU. Secondary law may therefore not set any legally 
binding policy goals. It may not introduce an enforcement mechanism that allows the 
Commission or the Council to substitute national policy decisions. 
Furthermore, on the basis of Article 121(6) TFEU, the Union legislator may not introduce, 
by means of secondary law, other sanctions than those foreseen by Article 121(4) TFEU. 
This can be seen having regard to Article 126(11) TFEU. In the context of the budgetary 
surveillance procedure, the Treaty defines in Article 126(11) TFEU, in an exhaustive 
manner, the range of possible sanctions in case of Member States’ non-compliance. This 
range also covers financial sanctions such as non-interest-bearing deposits or fines. 
Other sanctions than those foreseen by Article 126(11) TFEU may not be imposed on 
Member States. This follows from the general relationship between Member States’ 
sovereignty and the Union’s right to intervene. The autonomy of the first is the rule, 
whilst the latter is the exception that must be justified on the basis of Primary law. In 
particular with regard to financial sanctions, Article 126(11) TFEU as Article 311(3) TFEU, 
according to which the increase of payments from the Member States budgets to the 
general Union budget may only be introduced by unanimity and in accordance with 
respective national constitutional requirements of the Member States, reflect the general 
principle that Member States’ budgetary sovereignty may only be limited by Primary law 
but not by Secondary law and especially not by Secondary law, which may be adopted on 
the basis of a qualified majority and, by that, against the will of a Member State. Against 
this background, the introduction of enforcement measures in the context of the 
multilateral surveillance procedure other than those foreseen by Article 121(4) TFEU by 
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means of secondary law on the basis of Article 121(6) TFEU would be a violation of 
Primary law to the extent that they would cover sanctions. 
In sum, Article 121(6) TFEU can only serve as a legal base for a mechanism that 
reinforces the multilateral surveillance procedure without providing for enforcement 
mechanisms that are forbidden by Primary law.  
2.3.1.3 Incentive-based enforcement mechanism for matters falling under the 
multilateral surveillance procedure 
The establishment of an incentive-based enforcement of recommendations adopted 
under Article 121(2) TFEU or with a view to avoid risks jeopardising the functioning of the 
economic and monetary union could be based on Article 121(6) TFEU, although such an 
enforcement measure is not mentioned by this Article. The only explicit enforcement 
measure in Article 121(4) TFEU is a warning by the European Commission addressed to a 
Member State and the publication of the Council recommendation containing the policy 
reforms to remedy non-compliance. Against the background of the just outlined limits of 
Article 121(6) TFEU under section 2.3.1.2, Member States are, in principle, protected 
against any other sanctions under Article 121 TFEU than the warning or the publication of 
the Council recommendation. An incentive-based mechanism, however, cannot be 
considered as a ‘sanction’. A regulation based on Article 121(6) TFEU may provide for 
financial incentives for the adjustment of a Member State’s economic and fiscal policies 
to policy goals set by Union guidelines or by Council recommendations adopted under 
Article 121(4) TFEU. Such a regulation would not infringe Primary law. In contrast to 
sanctions, refusing payment of financial incentives in case of non-compliance does not 
worsen the position of a Member State. Prior to a possible adoption of a regulation on 
financial incentives a Member State would have no right to claim financial assistance as it 
has no right to claim it after the adoption of such a regulation in case of non-compliance. 
Therefore, an incentive-based enforcement measure would not infringe Member States’ 
sovereignty and would, hence, be covered by Article 121 TFEU. A legal act setting 
incentives for Member States to implement policy reforms required by broad economic 
guidelines could therefore be based on Article 121(6) TFEU.  
2.3.1.4 Function of Article 136 TFEU 
Seeing the limits of Article 121(6) TFEU, as outlined under section 2.3.1.2, one may raise 
the question whether Article 136(1)(a) TFEU, which allows for the adoption of measures 
specific to those Member States whose currency is the Euro in order ‘to strengthen the 
coordination and surveillance of their budgetary surveillance’. An extensive interpretation 
of Article 136(1)(a) TFEU allows to cover also measures concerning the economic policy 
coordination by it, although its wording refers to the ‘budgetary surveillance’. This follows 
from the fact the budgetary situation of a Member State is affected by it economic and 
fiscal policy decisions, which are coordinated under Article 121 TFEU. The economic 
policy coordination therefore aims at preventing excessive government deficits, which are 
to be observed and sanctioned under the budgetary surveillance procedure.  
Yet, a closer look at the wording of Article 136 TFEU reveals that the potential of Article 
136 TFEU is less significant than one may assume even on the basis of the extensive 
interpretation of Article 136(1)(a) TFEU. It states that ‘in order to ensure the proper 
functioning of economic and monetary union […], the Council shall, in accordance with 
the relevant procedure from among those referred to in Articles 121 and 126 […], adopt 
measures […].’ This is an institutionalised form of an enhanced cooperation where the 
decision authorising enhanced cooperation, which is required by Article 20(2) TEU and 
Article 329(1)(2) TFEU, is made for the Euro-Member States by Primary law and where 
the procedure for joining this enhanced cooperation is covered by Article 140 TFEU. As 
legal acts of any other enhanced cooperation, measures based on Article 136 TFEU have 
to comply with Primary law and may not modify it (Article 326 TFEU). This is confirmed 
by the wording of Article 136(1) TFEU, which requires act adopted on its basis to be ‘in 
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accordance with the relevant provisions of the Treaties’. This means that measures based 
on Article 136 TFEU may not modify Primary law. 
Against this background, it is worth mentioning that the ‘six pack’-legislation crossed the 
limits set by Primary law. The so-called reversed qualified majority voting, according to 
which a Commission recommendation is deemed to be adopted unless the Council 
decides by qualified majority to reject it, modifies the majority voting in the Council as 
prescribed by Article 16(3) TEU. Since Primary law cannot be modified on the basis of 
Article 136 TFEU, the reversed qualified majority voting cannot considered to be covered 
by this legal base. The same applies to the financial sanctions introduced by the ‘six 
pack’-legislation, which sanction non-compliance of measure taken under the multilateral 
surveillance procedure. Those sanctions are, however, not foreseen by Primary law in 
Article 121(4) TFEU. All in all the potential of Article 136 TFEU is little. It is linked to the 
scope of Article 121(6) TFEU and, by that, to the scope of the multilateral surveillance 
procedure.  
2.3.1.5 Article 121(6) TFEU as a legal base for EUBS? 
Against the background of this analysis of the scope and the limits of Article 121(6) 
TFEU, the main objective that has to be pursued by a measure, which is to be based on 
this provision, is the reinforcement of the multilateral surveillance procedure. The main 
purpose of a EUBS is to absorb asymmetric shocks and to stabilise labour markets. The 
impact of cyclical unemployment as a consequence of an asymmetric shock should be 
cushioned so that an asymmetric shock does not turn into a recession. Hence, EUBS can 
be understood as an instrument for macroeconomic stabilisation.  
Being an instrument of macroeconomic stabilisation, a EUBS is, however, not intended to 
reinforce the multilateral surveillance procedure under Article 121 TFEU. It is true that 
macroeconomic imbalances are covered by the multilateral surveillance procedure since 
the adoption of Regulation (EU) No 1176/2011 on the prevention and correction of 
macroeconomic imbalances.80 Yet, the prevention and correction of macroeconomic 
imbalances has, according to the regulatory concept of the ‘macroeconomic imbalances 
procedures’ (MIP), has to be done by national policy measures. At the European level, 
the Commission monitors these national policy reforms and, in case there is an excessive 
macroeconomic imbalance, the Council adopts country-specific recommendations. On the 
basis of Article 121(6) TFEU, the Union legislator may now adopt measures that aim at 
increasing compliance of Member States within the MIP. By that, measures based on 
Article 121(6) TFEU may only strengthen the stabilisation instrument of the multilateral 
surveillance procedure, which aims at monitoring national policies, but not introduce an 
entirely new stabilisation instrument such as the EUBS, which aims at mitigating costs 
attached to macroeconomic imbalances.  
Against this background, one may think of the establishment of an incentive-based 
enforcement mechanism for policy reforms in order to prevent or to correct 
macroeconomic imbalances, which grants financial support in return for policy reforms, 
on the basis of Article 121(6) TFEU.81 Under such a mechanisms, payments would be 
stalled in case of non-compliance with the policy goals set under the multilateral 
surveillance procedure. A mechanisms, which provides for financial support 
independently of any compliance with the broad guidelines set under Article 121(2) TFEU 
or the country-specific recommendations adopted under Article 121(4) TFEU cannot be 
considered as ‘detailed rules for the multilateral surveillance procedure’ in terms of 
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Article 121(6) TFEU. None of the EUBS options contains such conditionality, as it would 
run counter to the underlying rationale of a EUBS. 
These boundaries of Article 121(6) TFEU can also not be overcome by Article 136 TFEU 
with a view to the euro area Member States. As just outlined, EUBS is a stabilisation 
instrument next to the multilateral surveillance procedure and not part of the multilateral 
surveillance procedure. Article 136 TFEU, however, only allows for special rules within the 
boundaries set by Article 121 TFEU and is not flexibility clause for euro area Member 
States.  
In sum, none of the EUBS options could be realised by a legal act, which is to be based 
either on Article 121(6) TFEU or on Article 121(6) in conjunction with Article 136(1)(a) 
TFEU. 
2.3.2 Union financial assistance in case of crises (Article 122(2) TFEU) 
Under Article 122(2) TFEU, the Union may grant financial assistance to a Member State, 
which ‘is in difficulties or is seriously threatened with severe difficulties caused by […] 
exceptional occurrences beyond its control’.  
The main criterion for the use of this legal base is the ‘control’ of the Member State over 
the ‘exceptional occurrences’ that caused the difficulties or will cause severe difficulties 
for the Member State concerned. Whilst this criterion is only affirmative in the case of 
‘natural disasters’, it is more difficult to assess in the case of economic shocks that form 
‘exceptional occurrences’. On the one hand, global economic and financial crises can 
affect a Member State from the outside and lead to a serious threat to its fiscal stability. 
On the other hand, failed economic and fiscal policies may lead weak public budgets, 
which in a crisis situation are not able anymore to mitigate the expenses of such a crisis. 
The consequence of not meeting the condition of the lack of control of the Member State 
over the occurrence of the severe difficulties would be that the government budget of the 
Member State concerned has to bear the costs of mitigating the crisis on its own within 
the boundaries set by Article 126 TFEU and Council Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 on the 
excessive deficit procedure. 
In deciding whether the criterion in a given situation is fulfilled, the Council has a wide 
discretion.82 Indications for the understanding of this criterion in the context of economic 
crises can be found by looking closer at the only legal act that was based on Article 
122(2) TFEU until now, which is Regulation (EU) No 407/2010 establishing a European 
Financial Stability Mechanism (EFSM). Here the Council considered that difficulties 
beyond the control of the Member State concerned ‘may be caused by a serious 
deterioration in the international economic and financial environment’ (Recital No 2). 
According to the Council, an ‘unprecedented global financial crisis and economic 
downturn […] provoked a strong deterioration in the deficit and debt positions of the 
Member States’ (Recital No 3). By that, economic and financial crises, which lead to 
deterioration of government budgets, establish a presumption of being ‘beyond control’ 
of the Member State concerned. 
Against this background, the equivalent schemes could be based on Article 122(2) TFEU 
to the extent that the trigger relates to a ‘serious threat with severe difficulties’ for the 
Member State concerned. Amongst the four equivalent EUBS only the ‘reinsurance of 
national UBS’ (V4) appears to be suitable to be adopted in the basis of Article 122(2) 
TFEU. The trigger of a cut-off of 2% describes a situation of a severe recession, which 
can be considered as a serious threat with severe difficulties for the Member State 
concerned. The other triggers do not cross this threshold. For the same reason, the 
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genuine schemes cannot be based on Article 122(2) TFEU. They also apply when there is 
no crisis situation.  
The ‘reinsurance of national UBS’ option conflicts, however, with the requirement of 
‘certain conditions’ under Article 122(2) TFEU. Under the EFSM-Regulation, this 
requirement was implemented by requesting from the Member State seeking Union 
assistance to submit an ‘economic and financial adjustment programme’. By that, Union 
financial assistance can only be granted in return for policy reforms. The ‘reinsurance of 
national UBS’ applies automatically once the trigger is activated. The trigger forms the 
only condition. Since the trigger is already defining whether a sufficiently serious 
economic crisis is at stake, it cannot be sufficient to also fulfil the requirement of ‘certain 
conditions’ under Article 122(2) TFEU. The introduction of any further conditions into the 
EUBS option, which would render the scheme discretionary, would undermine its 
purpose. Based on these considerations, also the ‘reinsurance of national UBS’ option 
may not be established on the basis of Article 122(2) TFEU. 
2.4. Basing EUBS on the flexibility clause in Article 352(1) TFEU 
If the Treaties do not provide for a legal base, but legislating turns out to be necessary in 
order to attain Union objectives, the Council may adopt, on a proposal of the European 
Commission and after having obtained the consent from the European Parliament, legal 
acts on the basis of the so-called ‘flexibility clause’ in Article 352(1) TFEU.  
2.4.1 Scope of Article 352(1) TFEU 
The scope of Article 352(1) TFEU is defined by the ‘objectives set out in the Treaties’. The 
‘objectives’ in terms of Article 352(1) TFEU can be explicitly objectives, as enshrined in 
Article 3 TEU, as well as implicit objectives, which can be deduced from other Primary law 
norms. In this context, Declaration No 41, annexed by the Member State to the Lisbon 
Treaty, states ‘that the reference in Article 352(1) [TFEU] to objectives of the Union 
refers to the objectives as set out in Article 3(2) and (3) [TEU] … It is therefore excluded 
that an action based on Article 352 [TFEU] would only pursue objectives set out in Article 
3(1) [TEU].’ A declaration annexed to an international Treaty are not binding but ‘have to 
be taken into consideration as being instruments for the interpretation of the EC 
Treaty’.83 By that, the main focus for identifying objectives, which define the scope of 
Article 352(1) TFEU, is on Article 3(2) and (3) TEU. 
2.4.2 Limits of Article 352(1) TFEU 
According to its wording, Article 352(1) TFEU is limited in three respects. First, the Union 
action has to be necessary ‘within the framework of the policies defined by the Treaties’. 
Second, the Treaties must not provide for the necessary powers. The reference to the 
‘policies defined by the Treaties’ has to be understood as excluding all those measures, 
which cannot be attributed to one of the Union policies, and, by that, as preventing the 
Union from ‘capturing’ new policy areas on the basis of Article 352(1) TFEU. Finally, the 
Court established a further limit, which is the prohibition of an implicit Treaty 
amendment. 
2.4.2.1 No other express or implied Union competences 
More important than the reference to ‘policies defined by the Treaties’ is the requirement 
that the Treaties do not provide for the necessary powers. This refers to express Union 
competences as well as to implied powers. Implied powers are powers that are either 
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necessary for the exercise of express powers84 or indispensable for a Union institution in 
order to carry out a task conferred upon it by the Treaties.85 This means that Article 
352(1) TFEU may not serve as a legal basis if the Treaty provides for other express and 
implied Union competences. In return, Article 352(1) TFEU requires, in principle, that 
there is no other express or implied Union competence. Yet, according to the case law of 
the CJEU, Article 352(1) TFEU may also be used in cases, in which the measure would be 
covered by an existing Union competence, but this competence is deficient in certain 
aspects (it allows, for example, only for the adoption of directives instead of regulations), 
which is the reason why the intended act cannot be based on the existing Union 
competence.86 In such situation, the Union legislator may base its legal act in addition to 
the existing Union competence also on Article 352(1) TFEU.  
2.4.2.2 Prohibition of an implicit Treaty amendment 
In its opinion 2/94 on the accession of the European Union to the ECHR, the CJEU stated 
that Article 235 EEC (which is in substance replaced by today’s Article 352 TFEU) ‘being 
an integral part of an institutional system based on the principle of conferred powers, 
cannot serve as a basis for widening the scope of Community powers beyond the general 
framework created by the provisions of the Treaty as a whole and, in particular, by those 
that define the tasks and the activities of the Community. On any view, Article 235 
[today’s Article 352 TFEU] cannot be used as a basis for the adoption of provisions whose 
effect would, in substance, be to amend the Treaty without following the procedure which 
it provides for that purpose.’87 
This prohibition of an implicit Treaty amendment recalls the principle of conferral under 
Article 5(2) TEU, according to which the Union may act only within the limits of the 
competences conferred upon it by the Member States in the Treaties. Any additional 
competences require therefore a Treaty change. Yet, Article 352(1) TFEU is one of those 
conferred competences so that it seems to be circular to argue that legislating on the 
basis of Article 352(1) TFEU is limited by the principle of conferral. The Court therefore 
refers to the effect of the legal act, which would amount ‘in substance’ to a Treaty 
amendment. This means that a legal act, which is to be based on Article 352(1) TFEU, 
may not circumvent the established Treaty framework in a way that subject-matters, 
which are excluded by the overall European legal system, would be regulated by it.  
The prohibition of an implicit Treaty amendment draws, furthermore, the dividing line 
between those weaknesses in other Union competences, which may be compensated by 
basing the legal act also on Article 352(1) TFEU, and those limits of legal bases, which 
may not be overcome without Treaty change. In particular, constitutional saving clauses 
fall under the latter category. 
2.4.3 Article 352(1) TFEU as a legal base for EUBS? 
In order to use Article 352(1) TFEU as a legal base for establishing a EUBS, this must be 
necessary to attain one of the objectives set out in the Treaties. Amongst the Treaty 
                                                 
84 In that sense already CJEU, Case 8/55, Fédération Charbonnière de Belgique [1956] ECR 245, 
280. 
85 In that sense CJEU, Joined Cases 281/85, 283/85 to 285/85 and 287/85, Germany v 
Commission [1987] ECR 3203 para. 28. 
86 CJEU, Case C-166/07, Parliament v Council [2009] ECR I-7135 paras 64 et seq.; Case 252/87, 
Commission v Council [1989] ECR 1425 para. 37; Case 8/73, Hauptzollamt Bremerhaven 
[1973] ECR 897 para. 4. 
87 CJEU, Opinion 2/94 [1996] ECR I-1759 para. 30. 
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objectives enshrined in Article 3 TEU, one may refer in this respect to Article 3(3) TEU, 
according to which the Union shall establish ‘a highly competitive social market, aiming 
at full employment and social progress’ and promote ‘social justice and protection’, 
‘economic, social and territorial cohesion’ and ‘solidarity among Member States’. These 
objectives have to be read in conjunction with Article 9 TFEU, according to which in 
‘defining and implementing its policies and activities, the Union shall take into account 
requirements linked to the promotion of a high level of employment, the guarantee of 
adequate social protection, the fight against social exclusion, and a high level of 
education, training and protection of human health’. Moreover, Article 34(1) and (2) of 
the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, which binds the Union institutions, declares that 
the ‘Union recognises and respects the entitlement to social benefits and social services 
providing protection […] in the case of loss of unemployment’. All these provisions read 
together amalgamate into a clear Union objective that allows the Union to act in order to 
achieve a high standard of social cohesion in relation to unemployment.88  
A EUBS aims at stabilising Member States that are hit by an asymmetric shock by 
compensating for extraordinary expenses of the national UBS for short-term 
unemployment. High-level unemployment benefits have furthermore a cushioning effect 
on the declining private demand in an economic crisis situation. Moreover, a EUBS serves 
to achieve social cohesion as it would set incentives for national UBS that are less 
generous than the EUBS to align their conditions to the EUBS (see in that regard also 
section 2.2.6.4.1). Finally, a EUBS promotes social protection as it seeks to unify 
unemployment benefits for short-term unemployed people at a more generous level than 
the majority of the current national UBS. By that, establishing a EUBS serves to attain 
the Union objective to achieve a high standard of social cohesion in relation to 
unemployment. 
Once the attainment of a Union objective is established, the use of Article 352(1) TFEU 
requires that the Treaties do not provide for the necessary competences otherwise. As 
explained above, this does not only refer to the non-existence of a Union competence, 
but also to the insufficiency of existing Union competences. As regards EUBS, the latter is 
of importance. Several EUBS options could partly be established on the basis of other 
Union competences. Amongst the equivalent EUBS options the reinsurance of national 
UBS could partly be based on Article 122(2) TFEU (see section 2.3.2) and amongst the 
genuine EUBS options all variants except for  V8, V9 and V14 could partly be based on 
Article 175(3) TFEU (see section 2.2.6.4). The remaining equivalent EUBS options (V1 to 
V3) cannot be based on existing Union competences but would serve the attainment of 
the abovementioned Union objectives, so that they could be, in principle, based on Article 
352(1) TFEU. The remaining genuine EUBS options (V8, V9 and V14) fail to strengthen 
the social cohesion of the Union and can therefore not be assigned to any of the Union 
objectives. By that, they could also not be based on Article 352(1) TFEU alone. 
The question now arises whether basing the establishment of a EUBS in addition to the 
insufficient Union competences on Article 352(1) TFEU may lead to a compensation for 
the weaknesses of the insufficient legal bases. In order to assess whether such a 
compensation is legally possible, one has to define whether the limits of the insufficient 
legal bases are of such a nature that they can only be overcome by a Treaty amendment.  
2.4.3.1 Compensation for weaknesses of Article 122(2) TFEU with regard to the 
reinsurance of national EUBS (V4) 
The reinsurance of national UBS option (V4) could not be realised on the basis of Article 
122(2) TFEU because this legal base requires conditionality whilst EUBS is, by definition, 
                                                 
88 Cf. Hendrickx, Towards Labour Law for the United States of Europe, in: Countouris/Friedland 
(eds), Resocialising Europa in a Time of Crisis, Cambridge 2013, 61 at 71-73. 
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an instrument that is to be activated automatically once the predefined conditions are 
met.  
The issue of conditionality has two dimensions. First, it is explicitly mentioned by Article 
122(2) TFEU. Second, it is considered by the CJEU to be the essence of Article 125(1) 
TFEU, the so-called ‘no bailout’-clause. According to the CJEU, ‘Article 125 TFEU does not 
prohibit the granting of financial assistance […] provided that the conditions attached to 
such assistance are such as to prompt that Member State to implement a sound 
budgetary policy.’89 The Court assessed in its ‘Pringle’ decision whether the ESM-Treaty is 
in line with Article 125(1) TFEU since an intergovernmental Treaty of a subset of EU 
Member States may not modify Primary law. The same must apply to a legal act based 
on Article 352(1) TFEU. Article 125(1) TFEU sets an ultimate Treaty limit for any kind of 
secondary law. Article 352(1) TFEU may therefore not overcome conditionality in terms 
of Article 125(1) TFEU.  
This appears at first sight to be different with regard to ‘certain conditions’ in terms of 
Article 122(2) TFEU. Conditionality defines here the limits of a legal base, which might be 
compensated by additionally basing a Union measure on Article 352(1) TFEU. A strong 
argument in favour of this understanding can be found in the fact that adopting 
measures under Article 122(2) TFEU requires only a qualified majority in the Council 
(Article 16(3) TEU), whereas Article 352(1) TFEU refers to unanimity. Therefore lowering 
the requirements of legal base would be compensated by raising the procedural hurdles. 
This understanding of conditionality in Article 122(2) TFEU disregards the interplay 
between Article 122(2) TFEU and Article 125(1) TFEU. As it will be explained later in 
section 3, measures based on a legal base such as Article 122(2) TFEU that allows 
explicitly for financial transfers between the Union and the Member States have not to 
comply with Article 125(1) TFEU.90 The explicit legal base provides for the exception to 
the no-bailout clause. The reference to conditionality in Article 122(2) TFEU has therefore 
to be understood as ‘part of the necessary reconciliation of Article 122(2) and 125 
TFEU’.91 In this understanding, Art. 352(1) TFEU cannot overcome the ‘conditionality’ in 
Article 122(2) TFEU. The ‘reinsurance of national UBS’ option (V4) can therefore be 
realised on the basis of the existing Treaties if it complies with the conditionality as 
developed by the CJEU in the framework of Article 125(1) TFEU. Since both the 
conditionality under Article 122(2) TFEU and Article 125(1) TFEU have to be understood 
in the same way, reference shall now be made to section 3 elaborating on ‘conditionality’ 
in terms of Article 125(1) TFEU. 
2.4.3.2 Compensation for weaknesses of Article 175(3) TFEU with regard to 
genuine EUBS 
Genuine EUBS could not be based on Article 175(3) TFEU since this provision would 
undermine the limits set by Article 153 TFEU for legislating in the field of social security 
law, namely, in substantive terms, the prohibition to affect the right of Member States to 
define the fundamental principles of their social security systems (Article 153(4), first 
indent TFEU) and, in procedural terms, the unanimous voting rule in the Council (Article 
153(2) TFEU). These limits set for legal harmonisation of the national law on 
unemployment benefits are to be taken into account when establishing genuine EUBS as 
a specific action in order to strengthen the social cohesion in the EU because of a de 
facto harmonising effect of the co-existence of genuine EUBS and NUBS in the territory of 
                                                 
89 CJEU, Case C-370/12, Pringle, ECLI:EU:C:2012:759, para. 137. 
90 Cf. Louis, The No-Bailout Clause and Rescue Packages, CMLR 2010, 976 at 985. 
91 Louis, The No-Bailout Clause and Rescue Packages, CMLR 2010, 976 at 985. 
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the Member States on the law of the NUBS. This co-existence might result into 
adaptations of the national law of the UBS to the EUBS in order to smooth transitions 
between both schemes and in order to reduce additional costs for the administration of 
different UBS in the territory of the Member States. The de facto harmonising effect 
behind these adaptations is below legal harmonisation but would derive from economic 
and political processes within the Member States (see sections 2.2.5.3.2. and 2.2.6.3.2). 
The procedural point can easily be overcome by basing the establishment of the EUBS 
also on Article 352(1) TFEU since this provision requires a unanimous vote. It is getting 
more difficult with regard to the substantive point. Article 153(4), first indent TFEU is, as 
explained above (see section 2.2.5.2.2), a constitutional saving clause, which was 
included into the Treaties in order to shield certain areas of Member States’ remaining 
sovereignty from an ‘intrusion’ of EU law. Now the question arises whether on the basis 
of Article 352(1) TFEU, constitutional saving clauses may be overcome. 
In 2012, the European Commission tried to overcome a constitutional saving clause in 
Article 153 TFEU by relying on Article 352(1) TFEU. A similar constitutional saving clause 
to the one in Article 153(4) TFEU can be found in Article 153(5) TFEU. The Commission 
wanted to regulate the exercise of the right to take collective action within the context of 
the freedom of establishment and the freedom to provide services in the aftermath of the 
CJEU’s judgments in in ‘Viking’92 and ‘Laval’93. It based its proposal for a regulation94 on 
Article 352(1) TFEU although Article 153(5) TFEU excluded legislating on the basis of 
Article 153 TFEU with regard to ‘the right of association, the right to strike or the right to 
impose lock-outs’. The Commission argued that ‘Article 153(5) TFEU excludes the right to 
strike from the range of matters that can be regulated across the EU by way of minimum 
standards through Directives. However, the Court rulings [in cases ‘Viking’ and ‘Laval’] 
have clearly shown that the fact that Article 153 does not apply to the right to strike does 
not as such exclude collective action from the scope of EU law.’95 In other words, 
according to the European Commission, if a subject matter falls within the scope of EU 
law for example by affecting fundamental freedoms, it may be regulated on the basis of 
Article 352(1) TFEU. After the first Yellow Card by national Parliaments under the Early 
Warning Mechanism was issued against the Commission proposal, the Commission 
decided to withdraw the proposal.96  
It is true that the exclusion of subject matters in Article 153(5) TFEU may not lead to a 
prohibition to legislate in ‘questions involving any sort of link’ to the matters covered by 
this paragraph.97 If, however, a legal act aims at the core of subject matters covered by 
the exclusion, it may not be circumvented by basing the legal act on Article 352(1) TFEU 
instead of Article 153(2)(b) TFEU. The same reasoning applies to Article 153(4), first 
indent TFEU. By that, fundamental principles of the social security systems of the 
Member States may not be affected by any kind of Union legal act, even if it based on 
Article 352(1) TFEU. 
                                                 
92 CJEU, Case C-438/05, Viking [2007] ECR I-10779. 
93 CJEU, Case C-341/05, Laval [2007] ECR I-11767. 
94 European Commission, Proposal for a Council Regulation on the exercise of the right to take 
collective action within the context of the freedom of establishment and the freedom to provide 
services, COM(2012) 130 final. 
95 COM(2012) 130 final, p. 11. 
96 Goldoni, The Early Warning Mechanism and the Monti II Regulation: The Case for a Political 
Interpretation, EuConst 2014, p. 90. 
97 CJEU, Joined Cases C-395/08 and C-396/08, INPS [2010] ECR, I-5119 para. 37. 
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This reasoning excludes the adoption of a legal act on the basis of Article 352(1) TFEU 
that aims at legal harmonisation in areas that are considered to be fundamental 
principles of social security systems of the Member States. The argumentation can, 
however, not be applied in the same manner to a legal act that only sets incentives for 
aligning national security systems with conditions set by this legal act without creating a 
legal obligation to implement those conditions into the national legal order. As explained 
above (see section 2.2.6.4.1), a EUBS is distinct from the national UBS. Both UBS co-
exist within the territory of the Member State concerned. Within its scope of application, 
EUBS takes precedence over NUBS. The frictions relating to this co-existence of EUBS 
and NUBS within the national territory do not, as explained above in section 2.2.6.3.3, 
affect a Member State’s right to define the fundamental principles of its national social 
security system.  
More important with regard to the prohibition of undermining constitutional saving 
clauses in the Treaties is the situation, in which a more generous EUBS may lead, outside 
its scope of application, to a political or economic pressure on the national legislator to 
adjust the national UBS. It should be recalled that a legal act establishing the EUBS, 
which is adopted as a specific action under Article 175(3) TFEU, may not provide for any 
legal obligation to implement the criteria that it defined for the use of the EUBS with 
regard to the payment of the European unemployment benefit into the national legal 
order. Member States are legally free to regulate their NUBS outside the  scope of 
application of EUBS. Member States can therefore protect the fundamental principles of 
their social security systems by not adjusting them to the conditions of the EUBS without 
violating EU law. Political resistance to adjust the NUBS would, for example, not lead to 
an action of infringement initiated by the Commission under Article 258 TFEU. 
Furthermore, it has to be taken into account that a regulation establishing a EUBS on the 
basis of Articles 175(3) and 352(1) TFEU always has to be adopted by unanimity in the 
Council. Member States that are afraid of a negative impact of the EUBS on their national 
UBS may raise their veto in the Council. 
Against this background, genuine EUBS options, with the exception of V8, V9 and V14, 
may be adopted as a regulation on the basis of Articles 175(3) and 352(1) TFEU. 
2.4.3.3 Consequences for the decision-making procedure 
In procedural terms, joining legal bases with different decision-making procedures leads, 
according to the recent case law of the CJEU, to a combination of the decision-making 
procedures.98 This means with regard to a legal base that provides for the ordinary 
legislative procedure (such as Article 175(3) TFEU) and a legal base that provides for a 
special legislative procedure (such as Article 352(1) TFEU), that the ordinary legislative 
procedure is to be applied with a unanimous vote in the Council (replacing the qualified 
majority voting, which is normally foreseen in the ordinary legislative procedure). 
2.5. Short summary of the findings on the legal base 
Table 2 shows the possible legal bases as assigned to the identified predominant aims of 
the several EUBS options and the main features of the several EUBS options that have to 
be covered by a suitable legal base. 
Table 2. Possible legal bases 
  Possible legal bases 
  21(3) 48 121(6) 122(2) 148 153(2)(b) 175(3) 352(1) 
                                                 
98 CJEU, Case C-166/07, European Parliament v Council [2009] ECR I-7135 para. 69. 
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(genuine EUBS) 
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Macroeconomic 
stabilisation in case of 
(exogenous) crisis 
(equivalent EUBS) 
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Applicable to all 
unemployed people 
        
Beyond reinforcing 
multilateral surveillance 
        
Automatised application         
Autonomous fund         
Respect of constitutional 
saving clauses with regard 
to social security (no 
possibility to outvote a 
MS) 
        
 
Table 3 shows the 18 EUBS options and the legal basis, on which they could be adopted 
and which decision-making procedure it would entail. 
Table 3. 18 EUBS options and their legal base 
  Legal base EP Council Compliance with Art. 125 TFEU 
e
q
u
iv
a
le
n
t 
E
U
B
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V1/18 352(1) APP UN (–) 
V2/18 352(1) APP UN (+) 
V3/18 352(1) APP UN (+) 
V4/18 (–)    
g
e
n
u
in
e
 E
U
B
S
 
V5/18 175(3), 352(1) COD UN (+) 
V6/18 175(3), 352(1) COD UN (+) 
V7/18 175(3), 352(1) COD UN (+) 
V8/18 (–)    
V9/18 (–)    
V10/18 175(3), 352(1) COD UN (+) 
V11/18 175(3), 352(1) COD UN (+) 
V12/18 175(3), 352(1) COD UN (+) 
V13/18 175(3), 352(1) COD UN (+) 
V14/18 (–)    
V15/18 175(3), 352(1) COD UN (+) 
V16/18 175(3), 352(1) COD UN (–) 
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V17/18 175(3), 352(1) COD UN (–) 
V18/18 175(3), 352(1) COD UN (+) 
 
2.6. Principles of subsidiarity and of proportionality, Article 5 TEU 
Finally, any Union legal act has to respect the principles of subsidiarity (Article 5(3) TEU) 
and of proportionality (Article 5(4) TEU).  
According to the principle of subsidiarity, the Union legislator may only act ‘if and in so 
far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the 
Member States, either at central level or at regional and local level, but can rather, by 
reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved at Union level.’ 
The purpose of the EUBS is to establish a mechanism that supports unemployed people 
or the Member States’ unemployment benefit schemes union-wide. The necessity for 
establishing a EUBS derives from the fact that Member States are not able to achieve the 
same stabilisation effect as the one intended to achieve by EUBS on their own. Based on 
this consideration, Member States are not able to achieve this purpose for the 
establishment of a EUBS and the Union level is in a better position to achieve it. 
Furthermore, as explained above, none of the EUBS options can be introduced without a 
unanimous vote in the Council. Therefore, the adoption of EUBS in the Council gives rise 
to the presumption that the principle of subsidiarity is respected. 
The principle of proportionality requires that ‘the content and form of Union action shall 
not exceed what is necessary to achieve the objectives of the Treaties’. This refers in 
particular to the degree of how much the EUBS would interfere with the NUBS in place. 
Reference shall in this respect be made to the constitutional saving clauses in Article 
153(4) TFEU. Any EUBS, as explained above, has to respect these constitutional saving 
clauses in a way not affect the fundamental principles of Member States’ social security 
systems. These constitutional saving clauses are a codification of the principle of 
proportionality in the area of social security law. Therefore, as long as the EUBS does not 
violate these constitutional saving clauses, it is also in line with the principle of 
proportionality. Since, as established above, no legal act can be based on any Union 
competence that circumvents the constitutional saving clauses the principle of 
proportionality is, with regard to social security law, already observed by meeting the 
requirements of the chosen legal base. Proportionality would also apply to the financing 
side of the EUBS. Since proportionality is defined in relation to the objective of the Treaty 
that is to be achieved, the financial means assigned to the EUBS must be sufficient in 
order to either achieve the intended stabilisation effect with regard to the equivalent 
schemes or to achieve an effective reduction of disparities in relation to unemployment 
with regard to the genuine schemes. 
3. LIMITS FOR PAYMENT SET BY ARTICLE 125(1) TFEU  
Special attention with regard to the payment side of EUBS should be given to the limits 
set by Article 125(1) TFEU, the so-called ‘no bail-out’ clause. According to this provision, 
‘[t]he Union shall not be liable for or assume the commitments of central governments, 
regional, local or other public authorities, other bodies governed by public law, or public 
undertakings of any Member State’. At first sight, one may argue that the purpose of a 
EUBS is not assuming commitments of Member States and that, by that, EUBS does not 
affect Article 125(1) TFEU. It rather installs in form of the genuine schemes an insurance 
system aiming at one particular social risk (unemployment) or in form of the equivalent 
schemes a reinsurance of national insurance systems aiming at one particular social risk 
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(unemployment) a system of redistribution amongst Member States independently of a 
Member State’s ability to assume its own commitments.99  
Article 125(1) TFEU has, however, to be understood in a much broader sense. This 
provision embodies the general principle of Union law, according to which the Union is 
not allowed to finance Member States. Member States remain solely responsible for their 
budgetary commitments and, by that, for their fiscal stability. The Union may only 
interfere with Member States’ budgets as long as there is an explicit legal base for it. 
Therefore the Union is entitled to set up cohesion funds that finance activities in Member 
States (Article 174 et seqq. TFEU). Therefore the Union may grant financial assistance to 
Member States with a derogation in case of difficulties as regards their balances of 
payment (Article 143 TFEU). Therefore the Union may grant financial assistance to 
Member States in difficulties or seriously threatened with severe difficulties caused by 
natural disasters or exceptional occurrences beyond its control (Article 122(2) TFEU).100 
Beyond these legal bases, the Union is, in principle, not allowed to transfer funding to the 
Member States. The limits to transfers of funding, which are based on implied powers, on 
the flexibility clause in Article 352(1) TFEU or on intergovernmental agreements between 
(a subset of) Member States are then defined by Article 125(1) TFEU. 
With regard to Article 125(1) TFEU, the CJEU clarified in its ‘Pringle’ decision that ‘it is 
apparent from the wording used in Article 125 TFEU […] that that article is not intended 
to prohibit either the Union or the Member States from granting any form of financial 
assistance whatever to another Member State. […] [It] prohibits the Union and the 
Member States from granting financial assistance as a result of which the incentive of the 
recipient Member State to conduct a sound budgetary policy is diminished. […] 
Article 125 TFEU does not prohibit the granting of financial assistance […] provided that 
the conditions attached to such assistance are such as to prompt that Member State to 
implement a sound budgetary policy.’101 This follows for the Court from the ‘higher 
objective’ pursued by Article 125(1) TFEU, which is ‘namely maintaining the financial 
stability of the monetary union.’102 Sound budgetary policies are a necessary precondition 
for the financial stability of the Member State concerned and of the Euro area as a 
whole.103  
                                                 
99 In that sense Kullas and Sohn, Europäische Arbeitslosenversicherung – Ein wirkungsvoller 
Stabilisator für den Euroraum?, cepStudie, April 2015, p. 33. 
100 With regard to the relationship between Article 122(2) TFEU and Article 125(1) TFEU: Louis,  
The No-Bailout Clause and Rescue Packages, CMLR 2010, 976 at 983 et seq. and CJEU, Case 
C-370/12, Pringle, ECLI:EU:C:2012:756 para. 131. In detail on ‘Pringle’: Borger, The ESM and 
the European Court’s Predicament in Pringle, 14 German Law Journal (2013), 113; Craig, 
Pringle: Legal Reasoning, Text, Purpose and Teleology, 20 Maastricht Journal of European and 
Comparative Law 1 (2013), 3; de Witte and Beukers, The Court of Justice approves the 
creation of the European Stability Mechanism outside the EU legal order: Pringle, CMLR 2013, 
805. 
101 CJEU, Case C-370/12, Pringle, ECLI:EU:C:2012:756 paras 130, 136. 
102 CJEU, Case C-370/12, Pringle, ECLI:EU:C:2012:756 para 135. 
103 It should be noted at this point that the transfer of funding can be considered as ‘indispensable 
for the safeguarding of the financial stability of the euro area as a whole’ (CJEU, Case C-
370/12, Pringle, ECLI:EU:C:2012:756 para 136) already before a Member State is unable to 
refinance itself on the private markets. The objective of maintaining financial stability of the 
euro area as a whole includes the restoration of financial stability of a Member State as well as 
the prevention of financial instabilities (cf. Smulders and Keppenne, in: von der Groeben, 
Schwarze and Hatje (eds), Europäisches Unionsrecht, 2015, Artikel 125 AEUV para 15; de 
Witte and Beukers, The Court of Justice approves the creation of the European Stability 
Mechanism outside the EU legal order: Pringle, CMLR 2013, 805 at 842 et seq.; Louis, The No-
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Having regard to the purpose of Article 125(1) TFEU as interpreted by the CEJU, it 
becomes clear that any transfer of funding to a Member State, which cannot be traced 
back to an explicit legal base providing for such transfers, has to be designed in such a 
way that it prompts a Member State to implement sound budgetary policies or, in other 
words, that it does not set any incentives for national policies to avoid necessary 
structural reforms.  
As shown above, except for option V4 neither equivalent nor genuine EUBS options can 
be based on either Article 122(2) TFEU or Article 175(3) TFEU alone. The limits of these 
legal bases have to be compensated by additionally relying on Article 352(1) TFEU. EUBS 
options V1 to V3 have to be based solely on Article 352(1) TFEU. A EUBS must therefore 
also comply with the conditions set by Article 125(1) TFEU. Hence EUBS must prompt 
Member States to implement sound budgetary policies and may, by that, not set any 
incentives, which may allow Member States to avoid necessary structural reforms. 
Necessary structural reforms in the context of EUBS relate to labour market reforms. This 
derives from the fact that the most important incentive for Member States to reform the 
labour markets are the costs attached to labour market failure, which are the 
unemployment benefits. If now another authority than the national authorities pays for 
the costs of unemployment, the financial incentive for national policies to reform labour 
markets could appear to be diminished by the establishment of a EUBS. This shows that 
there is an inherent link between the financial transfers from the EU to the national level 
and the necessity to reform labour markets at the national level. Other structural 
reforms, as politically desirable they might be considered, cannot be linked to transfer of 
funding from a EUBS as European unemployment benefits would not relax expenses 
related to failed or neglected structural reforms in other policy areas. 
There are three elements that can be found in the several EUBS options, which may 
serve as incentives for Member States to continously reform national labour markets 
although (parts of) the costs related to short-term unemployment would be borne by the 
European level: Experience rating, claw-back and minimum requirements with regard to 
activation policies. Experience rating refers to a mechanism that links the EUBS 
contributions to the past experience of the contributors with unemployment and, by that, 
to the likelihood of the contributor to avail itself of the EUBS fund. Linking the 
contributions to the EUBS to the extent EUBS is used sets a financial incentive for 
Member States to reform labour markets and prevents permanent redistribution between 
Member States with a low short-term unemployment rate to countries with high short-
term unemployment rate. Claw-back is a mechanism, which allows for an adjustment of 
the contributions to the EUBS by referring to the long-term development of positive or 
negative net pay-ins into the EUBS by Member States. At present, it is proposed to 
activate a claw-back after 3 years of more than 1% of GDP cumulative negative balance 
vis-à-vis EUBS. The contribution of the Member State in question would then be raised 
until the balance declines below the 1%-threshold. The mechanism seeks to achieve a 
long-term country-level budget neutrality. Minimum requirements with regard to 
activation policies link the use of EUBS with measures to prompt and to support the 
unemployed person to be employed again and contribute, by that, in a legally binding 
manner to the reforms of national labour markets.  
Combining experience rating with claw-back mechanisms and minimum requirements 
with regard to activation policies leads to an overall system that sets enough incentives 
for national labour policies to reform their labour markets. It should be noted that the 
                                                                                                                                                        
Bailout Clause and Rescue Packages, CMLR 2010, 976 at 985). The core element of Article 
125(1) TFEU is therefore less whether a transfer of funding is ‘indispensable’ but rather 
whether the conditions attached to it prompt a Member State to implement sound budgetary 
policies as any transfer of funding releases a Member State from the refinancing pressure on 
private markets. 
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need for minimum requirements for activation policies in order to prevent institutional 
moral hazard is linked to the effectiveness of experience rating and claw-back 
mechanisms. If both perform ideally, firm and far-reaching minimum requirements for 
activation policies are practically not needed since the financial adjustments resulting 
from experience rating and claw-back should prevent a shift of the financial responsibility 
for national labour market failure to the EU level. Yet it appears, in practice, still to be 
recommendable to set legally binding minimum requirements for activation policies 
although they do not have to be far-reaching in order to be effective next to experience 
rating and a claw-back mechanism. Against this background, it is therefore still sufficient 
with a view to Article 125(1) TFEU in order to prevent institutional moral hazard that on 
the basis of Article 153(2)(b) TFEU only those elements of activation policies can be 
harmonised that are necessary for the social security and social protection of workers 
(Article 153(1)(c) TFEU).104  
In sum, if a EUBS provides for experience rating, claw-back and minimum requirements 
with regard to activation policies, it can be considered as not violating Article 125(1) 
TFEU. It is also worth mentioning at this point that the EUBS should not include any kind 
of mechanism to ease these elements in case of an economic crisis in order to give a 
Member State in crisis additional public budgetary leeway.105 If a Member State is in a 
situation of difficulties to refinance public budgets because of an economic crisis, the 
current legal framework requires from this Member State to request financial assistance 
from the ESM and in line with the conditions set by Regulation (EU) No 472/2013106 
instead of gaining national budgetary leeway by suspending financial obligations without 
having to comply with these conditions. This famework cannot be undermined by an 
easing mechanism for economic crisis’ situations with regard to experience rating or 
claw-back in a EUBS. 
Against this background, amongst the equivalent EUBS options V1 violate Article 125(1) 
TFEU as it does not provide for experience rating (V1). The same applies to V16 (no 
experience rating) and V17 (no claw-back mechanism) amongst the genuine EUBS 
options. The equivalent EUBS option V4 could have been based exclusively on Article 
122(2) TFEU. As it was explained  above in section 2.3.2, the ‘conditionality’ requirement 
in Article 122(2) TFEU has to be interpreted in the same way as the ‘conditionality’ under 
Article 125(1) TFEU. Since V4 does not provide for a claw-back mechanism, it does not 
meet the conditionality criterion in Article 122(2) TFEU. 
4. ESTABLISHING THE FINANCING SIDE OF A EUBS 
Under section 2 it was discussed whether the Treaties provide for a legal basis in order to 
establish a payment scheme at European level that includes benefits for Union citizens in 
case of short-term unemployment. Whilst therefore section 2 dealt with legal questions 
relating to Union expenditure, the present section addresses the legal questions relating 
to the revenue of EUBS. There are two possibilities for the financing of EUBS imaginable: 
Either EUBS is financed by the general Union budget (4.1) or it is financed by a dedicated 
fund outside the general Union budget (4.2). Examples in the recent legislative activities 
                                                 
104 Cf. section 2.2.5.3.3 on the limits of Article 153(2)(b) TFEU with regard to activation policies. 
105 One might imagine that an adjustment of a Member State’s contributions to the EUBS fund 
under the claw-back mechanism is suspended in times of a recession in order to allow e.g. 
more public investments. 
106 Regulation (EU) No 472/2013 of 21 May 2013 on the strengthening of economic and budgetary 
surveillance of Member States in the euro area experiencing or threatened with serious 
difficulties with respect to their financial stability [2013] OJ L 140, p. 1. 
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of the Union legislator for the latter can be found in the establishment of a ‘Single 
Resolution Fund’.107 
4.1. Introducing a budget line in the general Union budget 
Following the principle established by the CJEU in Case C-106/96, according to which 
‘[a]ny Community expenditure […] requires a dual legal basis: entry in the budget and, 
as a general rule, prior adoption of an act of secondary legislation authorising the 
expenditure in question’,108 Union expenditure, which is established by a Union secondary 
legal act, has to be included into the Union’s general budget.  
 Legal base for the inclusion in the Union’s general budget 4.1.1.
The legal base for the inclusion of expenditure into the Union’s annual budget is Article 
314 TFEU together with Regulation No 966/2012 on the financial rules applicable to the 
general budget of the Union.109  
 Contributions earmarked to the budget line 4.1.2.
More important for the legal framework of revenue of the EUBS than the assessment of 
the way on how to include expenditure into the general Union budget is the rule under 
Article 17(1) of Regulation No 966/2012 on the financial rules applicable to the general 
budget of the Union110 (hereinafter: Regulation on financial rules), according to which 
‘[r]evenue and payment appropriations shall be in balance’. The importance of this rule 
becomes clear when one realises that the amount of payment appropriations needed for 
a EUBS is beyond the financing capacity of the current general Union budget. This leads 
therefore to the question of raising additional financial contributions in order to finance 
expenditure relating to EUBS. In this context, one has to distinguish between the 
equivalent EUBS options, where the contributions are paid by the Member States 
(4.1.2.1), and the genuine EUBS options, where the contributions are paid by the 
individuals (4.1.2.2). Finally, for the political persuasiveness of additional financial 
contributions, it is important to assess whether such additional contributions can be 
earmarked for the exclusive use by the EUBS (4.1.2.4). 
The starting point for the following analysis is Article 311(2) TFEU, according to which the 
general Union budget shall be financed wholly from own resources, without prejudice to 
other revenue. This means that there are two sources of income for the general Union 
budget: Own resources and other revenue. The former is defined by a legal act, whose 
legal basis is Article 311(3) TFEU, the so-called Own Resources Decision,111 whilst the 
                                                 
107 Articles 67 et seqq. of Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 of 15 July 2014 establishing uniform rules 
and a uniform procedure for the resolution of credit institutions and certain investment firms in 
the framework of a Single Resolution Mechanism and a Single Resolution Fund and amending 
Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010, [2014] OJ L 225, p. 1. 
108 CJEU, Case C-106/96, United Kingdom v Commission [1998] ECR I-2729 para. 19. 
109 Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012 of the European Parliament and the Council of 25 
October 2012 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union and repealing 
Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002 [2012] OJ L 298, p. 1. 
110 Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012 of the European Parliament and the Council of 25 
October 2012 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union and repealing 
Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002 [2012] OJ L 298, p. 1. 
111 Council Decision 2007/436/EC, Euratom of 7 June 2007 on the system of the European 
Communities’ own resources, [2007] OJ L 163, p. 17. 
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latter as a category is not defined by any act of secondary law. This means that the 
Union may only raise own resources, as they are defined by the Own Resources Decision, 
or may generate ‘other revenue’ as long as there is a legal base for it in the Treaties. 
4.1.2.1 Contributions paid by Member States (equivalent EUBS) 
First, one has to specify whether additional financial contributions by Member States in 
order to finance the EUBS are to be considered as a new ‘own resource’ or ‘other 
revenue’. If such contributions are to be classified as ‘other revenue’, they can be 
included into legal act establishing the EUBS.  
The ‘own resources’ are, as explained above, defined by the Own Resources Decision. It 
becomes more difficult to define ‘other revenue’. Article 311(2) TFEU indicates that ‘other 
revenue’ are those sources of income of the Union, which are not primarily intended to 
finance the general Union budget.112 According to this provision, the Union budget shall 
be wholly financed from own resources ‘without prejudice to other revenue’. This means 
that only revenue originating from own resources may be used for balancing the general 
Union budget and that ‘other revenue’ may not replace such revenue from own 
resources. Put differently, if revenue may not be used to balance the general Union 
budget but to finance exclusively a specific purpose, it may be considered ‘other revenue’ 
in terms of Article 311(2) TFEU. 
Examples can be found by having a closer look at external assigned revenue in terms of 
Article 21(2) of the Regulation of financial rules. This provision lists certain financial 
contributions from Member States to finance certain Union programmes and actions such 
as research programmes or external aid projects. Budget items financed by such 
‘external assigned revenue’ are, according to Recital No 8 of the Regulation laying down 
the multiannual financial framework for the years 2014-2020,113 not to be taken into 
account by the ceilings set by the multiannual financial framework. Such exclusion from 
the MFF ceilings makes only sense if the revenue assigned to its financing is not 
considered as ‘own resource’, since ‘own resources’ finance the expenditure of the 
general Union budget, which is, according to Article 312 TFEU, defined by the MFF. From 
the perspective of the general Union budget, assigned revenue and budget items 
financed by this assigned revenue are neutral. The amount of the assigned revenue 
equals the amount of the budget item that it finances. Therefore, raising such assigned 
revenue does not conflict in the same way with Member States’ budgetary sovereignty as 
raising revenue for the general Union budget. There is therefore no need to apply the 
higher procedural hurdles enshrined in Article 311(3) TFEU for creating assigned 
revenue. In sum, assigned revenue, which is not used to balance the general Union 
budget, is considered ‘other revenue’ in terms of Article 311(2) TFEU and may therefore 
be raised without modifying the Own Resource Decision under Article 311(3) TFEU.  
Yet, raising ‘other revenue’ may not be based on Article 311(2) TFEU since this is no 
legal base. Article 311(2) TFEU only confirms that ‘other revenue’ generated by a legal 
act adopted on the basis of Union competences may constitute a source of income of the 
Union. Therefore, as a second step after the classification of financial contributions by 
Member States earmarked to finance EUBS as ‘other revenue’, one must identify the 
legal base in the Treaties for raising contributions from the Member States to finance the 
EUBS. In principle, financial contributions should be defined by the legal act that 
established the legal framework for the payments, which the contributions should 
finance. In the case of EUBS this means, that, in addition to the payment side of the 
                                                 
112 CJEU, Case 265/87, Schräder [1989] ECR 2237 para. 10. 
113 Council Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 1311/2013 of 2 December 2013 laying down the 
multiannual financial framework for the years 2014-2020 [2013] OJ L 347, p. 884. 
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EUBS, the legal base for the act establishing the EUBS would also have to support the 
financing side. In this regard, financial contributions paid by EU Member States, which 
are additional to the contributions paid by Member States under the Own Resources 
Decision (GNI contributions), can, in principle, not be created by another majority than 
the one foreseen by Article 311(3) TFEU. Raising additional financial contributions from 
Member States on the basis of a legal base, which refers to another decision-making 
procedure than Article 311(3) TFEU (Article 352(1) TFEU, for example, requires 
unanimity but does not refer to an approval by Member States in accordance with their 
respective constitutional requirements) appears therefore to undermine the own 
resources legislative procedure, whose purpose is to protect Member States’ budgetary 
sovereignty. 
In the existing EU law concerning Union agencies there is, however, precedent, which 
contradicts the just mentioned finding. The Union legislator already raised additional 
financial contributions from Member States in accordance with the ordinary legislative 
procedure. Article 62(1)(a) of the regulation on the European Banking Authority114 
provides for ‘obligatory contributions from the national public authorities’ to the budget of 
EBA. The legal base for the EBA regulation is Article 114(1) TFEU. This suggests that the 
creation of additional financial contributions from EU Member States does not per se 
require the same majority as the one foreseen by Article 311(3) TFEU and not even the 
consent of every EU Member State. 
There are, however, good reasons to come to the conclusion that with regard to 
additional contributions of Member States to finance a newly created Union task such as 
the EUBS at least unanimity is required and, by that, only Article 352 TFEU would be the 
right legal base for additional financial contributions. Contributions paid by competent 
national authorities to the budget of a Union authority that is distinct from the EU budget 
(like the EBA budget) cannot be compared to earmarked contributions paid by Member 
States to the general EU budget. Allowing to create additional financial contributions 
without the possibility for a single Member State to raise its veto against a financial 
obligation would undermine the clear Treaty statement in Article 311(3) TFEU according 
to which no additional financial burden for the Member States’ budget can be created by 
the European Union without the approval of all Member States. The use of legal bases, 
which refer to a qualified majority voting in the Council, is, furthermore, highly 
questionable with regard to Member States budgetary sovereignty protected by the 
national constitutions. Therefore, being classified as ‘other revenue’, earmarked financial 
contributions by Member States can be included into the legal act establishing the EUBS. 
The adoption of this legal act is then only possible on the basis of Article 352(1) TFEU.   
4.1.2.2 Contributions paid by individuals (genuine EUBS) 
Genuine EUBS options are financed through contributions from employers or employees. 
As with regard to contributions from Member States, it has to be assessed with regard to 
contributions from individuals whether these constitute an own resource or other 
revenue. The reasons put forward for arguing that earmarked contributions by Member 
States in order to finance EUBS apply to the same extent to earmarked financial 
contributions by individuals. 
The main difference between contributions paid by Member States and contributions paid 
by individuals refers less to the qualification of the contribution under EU budget law but 
more to the powers of the Union to levy financial contributions from individuals. This was 
                                                 
114 Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 
2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Banking Authority), amending 
Decision No 716/2009/EC and repealing Commission Decision 2009/78/EC [2010] OJ L 331, p. 
12. 
Feasibility and Added Value of a European Unemployment Benefit Scheme  
 
 2017  50 
the driving factor behind the conclusion of an intergovernmental agreement on the 
transfer and mutualisation of contributions to the Single Resolution Fund (SRF). The SRF 
was established by a Union regulation (Articles 67 et seqq. of Regulation (EU) No 
806/2014) and is exclusively financed by credit institutions. Whilst the establishment of 
the Fund was done on the basis of EU law, the transfer of the contributions levied by the 
national authorities to the SRF was based on an intergovernmental agreement.  
Whether such a distinction between the establishment of the Fund and the power to levy 
the contributions is required by EU law can be disputed. Reference shall be made to the 
judgment of the CJEU in the ‘Vodafone’ case.115 In this case the Court considered valid a 
Union regulation based on Article 114(1) TFEU, which introduced Union wide roaming 
caps directly applicable to telecommunication operators. Imposing roaming caps on 
private market operators can be compared with regard to the intensity of interference 
with an individual’s freedoms with imposing contributions on individuals. Based on this 
consideration, there is enough legal ground for establishing financial contributions paid 
by individuals on the basis of a Union competence.  
A precedent for raising contributions directly from individuals can be found in Article 9 of 
Regulation (EC) No 443/2009 setting emission performance standards for new passenger 
cars as part of the former Community’s integrated approach to reduce CO2 emissions 
from light-duty vehicles. According to this Article ‘in respect of each calendar year from 
2012 onwards for which a manufacturer’s average specific emissions of CO2 exceed its 
specific emissions target in that year, the Commission shall impose an excess emissions 
premium on the manufacturer or, in the case of a pool, the pool manager’. Furthermore, 
‘the amounts of the excess emissions premium shall be considered as revenue for the 
general budget of the European Union’ according to Article 9(4) of the Regulation. It is 
worth mentioning that Member States’ constitutional courts did not raise any 
constitutional objections against the rule in Article 9 of Regulation (EC) No 443/2009. 
Yet, the example of the SRF shows that also an intergovernmental agreement could be 
envisaged. In its ‘Pringle’ judgment, the CJEU clarified that, in fields where there is no 
specific competence conferred upon the Union and where the Union legislator has not yet 
acted, the Member States may instead of adopting Union legislation also conclude 
international agreements.116 This refers in particular to situations where Article 352(1) 
TFEU would be the only suitable legal base. It would therefore not violate EU law if 
Member State concluded an intergovernmental agreement following the model of the SRF 
in order to agree on levying the financial contributions from individuals. 
From an operational point of view, it would even be recommendable to supplement a 
Union legal act establishing a genuine EUBS by an intergovernmental agreement 
concerning the financial contributions paid by individuals. In such a situation, national 
authorities would keep on levying contributions for financing unemployment benefits. 
Only the part, which finances the EUBS would have to be transferred by the national 
authorities to the European fund whilst the national part remains in the national UBS. 
Such a construction would facilitate the practical implementation of a EUBS in the 
national legal orders. 
4.1.2.3 Financing through EU own taxes 
Finally, there are proposals to finance EUBS through EU own taxes such as a dedicated 
tax on consumption or labour. An EU own tax can be introduced under the existing 
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Treaties in two steps: First, the EU tax has to be established on the basis of a Union 
competence. Second, the EU own tax has to be included as a new own resource in the 
Own Resources Decision according to the procedure laid down in Article 311(3) TFEU. 
Article 311 TFEU does not itself provide for any legal basis to establish taxes. An EU own 
tax has to be considered as an ‘own resource’ and not as ‘other revenue’ since the 
purpose of a tax is to finance the general budget. 
The Union can adopt measures in tax matters on the basis of Article 113 TFEU concerning 
indirect taxes, Article 115 TFEU concerning direct taxes, Article 192(2)(1)(a) TFEU 
concerning environmental taxes, Article 194(3) TFEU concerning energy taxes and Article 
352 TFEU. Article 115 TFEU only serves as a basis for tax legislation by means of 
directives. An EU own tax can only be created by means of a regulation. Article 113 TFEU 
is not restricted to directives but requires a ‘harmonisation of legislation’. The 
establishment of an EU own tax can hardly be considered as a ‘harmonisation’. Although 
the CJEU decided that the establishment of an own EU agency can be done by means of 
regulation on the basis of Article 114 TFEU, that requires ‘approximation’, such an 
establishment is only possible ‘in order to facilitate the uniform implementation and 
application of acts based on that provision’.117 As long as the establishment of an EU 
agency (or tax) facilitates an existing EU legal act it can be based on ‘harmonising’ legal 
bases. An EU own tax, however, cannot be considered as an ‘annex’ to an existing EU 
legal act. It is not ‘harmonisation’ in terms of Article 113 TFEU and it is not 
‘approximation’ in terms of Article 115 TFEU. Articles 192 and 194 TFEU allow for the 
adoption of ‘provisions’ (Article 192 TFEU) and ‘measures’ (Article 194 TFEU) if they are 
‘primarily of a fiscal nature’. This includes regulations. Except for those very specific 
fields, the only remaining legal basis for the establishment of an EU own tax would be 
Article 352 TFEU. There can be, however, no legislation based on Article 352 TFEU if an 
overall assessment of all possible legal bases results in the conclusion that legislating on 
the basis of Article 352 TFEU would amount to a circumvention of the division of 
competences between the EU and Member States. The Treaties only provided for a 
possibility to adopt ‘measures’ in very specific fields (environment and energy). In all 
other fields of taxation it only provides for harmonisation of Member States’ legislation 
and the adoption of directives. This means, conversely, that the Treaties do not provide 
for any legal basis for an EU own tax, which cannot be circumvented by relying on Article 
352 TFEU.118 
This finding is supported by the fact that the introduction of an EU own tax requires an 
enhanced democratic control which is not foreseen by the existing legal bases in tax 
matters. Articles 113 and 115 TFEU only require a consultation of the European 
Parliament and Article 352 TFEU only requires consent by the European Parliament. 
Taxation, however, requires representation. The creation of a future legal base for an EU 
tax whose purpose is to generate revenue for the EU needs a complete involvement of 
the European Parliament and special rules on taxation in Primary law (comparable to a 
financial constitution).119 
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4.1.2.4 Earmarking contributions to expenditure of EUBS 
An important feature for the financing side of the EUBS is the possibility to earmark 
contributions raised for the purpose of financing the EUBS so that revenue originating 
from these contributions may not be used in order to finance other Union tasks. Without 
such earmarking additional financial contributions raised from either Member States or 
individuals have to be considered as financing the general Union budget and would then 
have to be included into the Own Resources Decision. 
With regard to own resources, Article 6 of the Own Resources Decision states that ‘the 
revenue […] shall be used without distinction to finance all expenditure entered in the 
general budget of the European Union.’ The wording appears to preclude any possibility 
to earmark certain contributions. One has, however, to distinguish the establishment of 
expenditure that is directly linked to a certain own resource, which is prohibited, and the 
establishment of a new budget line financed by revenue originating from certain financial 
contributions. With regard to the latter, Article 21(1) of the Regulation on financial rules 
states that ‘[e]xternal assigned revenue and internal assigned revenue shall be used to 
finance specific items of expenditure’. By that, EU budget law recognises the possibility to 
earmark certain revenue. It only excludes the earmarking of own resources, which are, 
by definition, intended to balance the general Union budget. Article 21 distinguishes 
between external and internal assigned revenue. The distinction is made according to the 
source of the revenue. If the revenue originates from contributions of Member States or 
third parties, it is considered as ‘external assigned revenue’. If the revenue originates 
from transactions, in which Union institutions are involved, it is to be qualified as ‘internal 
assigned revenue’. Contributions to finance EUBS are therefore ‘external assigned 
revenue’ and would be classified as ‘revenue earmarked for a specific purpose’ under 
Article 21(2)(d) of the Regulation on financial rules.  
Whilst the Regulation on financial rules confirms the existence of earmarked revenue, it 
does not provide for a legal base to assign external revenue. This has to be done by the 
legal act raising the earmarked financial contributions. With regard to EUBS, this means 
that the legal act establishing the EUBS has also to earmark the financial contributions 
raised by either the Member States or individuals. It is, finally, worth to recall that 
expenditure financed by ‘external assigned revenue’ is not to be taken into account by 
the ceilings set by the multiannual financial framework.  
4.2. Establishment of a dedicated fund outside the general Union budget 
As an alternative to introducing a budget line in the general Union budget, which is 
exclusively financed by external assigned revenue originating from financial contributions 
raised either from Member States (equivalent EUBS) or from individuals (genuine EUBS), 
one may consider the establishment of a fund outside the general Union budget, which 
finances EUBS, following the model of the European Development Fund (EDF). The EDF is 
a fund that has been set up by the Member States and not by the Council, whose 
expenditure is assumed directly by the Member States and not the Union. The CJEU 
considered the EDF valid, even though the former Community had a competence for 
development cooperation (Articles 208 et seqq. of today’s TFEU). The Member States had 
the competence to set up such a fund since ‘the Community’s competence in that field is 
not exclusive. The Member States are accordingly entitled to enter into commitments 
themselves vis-à-vis non-member States, either collectively or individually or even jointly 
with the Community’.120 In other words, as long as there is no exclusive Union 
competence and as long as a shared competence was not yet used by the Union 
legislator, the Member States may also set up a fund outside the general Union budget. 
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Since there is not yet any EUBS, a fund financing such scheme could, according to this 
case law, also be established outside the general Union budget. 
Yet, establishing a fund outside the general Union budget may not undermine the 
budgetary control function and rights of the European Parliament and the Council. In 
principle, establishing a Fund outside the general Union budget although there is a Union 
competence for establishing such a fund within the general Union budget runs counter 
the general principle of unity of the EU budget and its completeness, as enshrined in 
Article 310(1) TFEU, according to which ‘all items of revenue and expenditure of the 
Union shall be included in estimates to be drawn up for each financial year and shall be 
shown in the budget’. The principle of unity requires that all revenues and expenditures 
of the Union are part of one EU budget. It forbids any kind of separate or subsidiary 
budget within the EU framework. The principle of unity includes the completeness of the 
EU budget which requires that the one EU budget which is established under the principle 
of unity is complete and includes every predictable revenue and expenditure of the 
Union.  
The purpose of this principle is the protection of the budgetary powers of the Council 
and, in particular, of the European Parliament. The Treaties have very carefully balanced 
the participation rights of the European Parliament and the Council in the Union’s 
budgetary procedure with the decision-making procedure under Article 314 TFEU, the 
discharge duty of the Commission towards the European Parliament under Article 319 
TFEU and the adoption of the financial rules regulation in the ordinary legislative 
procedure under Article 322 TFEU. Especially the strong position of the European 
Parliament as the representative of the Union citizens (Article 10 TEU) exercising 
budgetary functions jointly with the Council (Article 14(1) TEU) could be undermined by a 
restrictive interpretation of Article 310(1) TFEU which would allow separate funds within 
the EU framework but outside of EU budget law. The Council as the representative of the 
governments of the Member States does not need a comparable protection as Member 
States’ governments are also involved in the decision on public spending outside of the 
Union framework. It could, however, be otherwise if not all the Member States which 
participate in the Council take part in decisions on public spending. 
The case law of the CJEU, allowing funds within the EU framework but outside the EU 
budget, and the aforementioned restrictive interpretation of Article 310(1) TFEU can be 
reconciled by allowing, in principle, to set up a fund outside the general Union budget 
provided that the European Parliament and the Council as budgetary authorities exercise 
a control over the fund as foreseen by the EU budget law in Articles 310 et seqq. TFEU.121 
This view is confirmed by the EDF judgment of the CJEU since the European Parliament 
has, at least, to discharge the Commission for the financial management of the EDF 
according to Article 11(8) of the Internal Agreement on the financing of Community 
aid.122 A fund financing EUBS established outside the general Union budget has therefore 
to provide for an involvement of the European Parliament in the supervision of the action 
of the fund as in the discharge of its financial management. 
Based on this reasoning and subject to the just mentioned conditions, the EUBS could 
also be financed by a fund established outside the general Union budget. 
                                                 
121 Repasi, Legal options for an additional EMU fiscal capacity, Study for the European Parliament 
2013, p. 17, 19. 
122 [2006] OJ L 247, p. 32. 
Feasibility and Added Value of a European Unemployment Benefit Scheme  
 
 2017  54 
 Legal base 4.2.1.
There are two ways on how a fund outside the general Union budget could be 
established. It could be done by founding a Union agency with a legal personality distinct 
from the Union, whose budget is the fund, based on Article 352(1) TFEU. The ‘Office for 
Harmonisation in the Internal Market’ (OHMI) can be considered as a precedent for this 
way of establishing a fund outside the general Union budget.123  
Alternatively, the ‘Representatives of the Governments of the Member States, meeting 
within the Council’ could conclude an intergovernmental agreement establishing the fund 
financing the EUBS. This would follow the legislative technique used for the EDF and 
confirmed by the judgment of the CJEU on the legality of the EDF. Another example is 
the ESM-Treaty, which was concluded even though the ESM could also have been 
established on the basis of Article 352(1) TFEU.  
 Contributions to a dedicated fund 4.2.2.
Contributions to the fund could be raised either from Member States or from individuals if 
provided for by the regulation establishing the EUBS agency whose budget would be the 
EUBS fund or agreed upon by the Member States in an intergovernmental agreement.  
This general right to raise contributions is limited by the duty not to circumvent 
limitations foreseen by EU law. Member States are not allowed by simply using a 
different legislative technique to undermine the distribution of competences between the 
Union and Member States, on the one hand, and the involvement of Union institutions 
such as the European Parliament, on the other hand. Those limitations were previously 
outlined in section 4.1.2. In brief, the limitations may be summarised that no Member 
State may be obliged to pay any contributions against its will. There are no further 
limitations deriving from EU budget law since contributions to a dedicated fund can be 
compared to earmarked contributions to the general Union budget. Therefore, the legal 
act raising financial contributes for a dedicated fund has to observe the abovementioned 
conditions for generating other revenue. 
Since both a legal act establishing a Union agency whose budget would finance EUBS on 
the basis of Article 352(1) TFEU or an intergovernmental agreement require either a 
unanimous vote or a ratification by all Member States, raising contribution for a 
dedicated EUBS fund outside the general Union budget would not undermine EU law and 
is, by that, legally possible. 
4.3. Possibility to raise debt 
Finally, some EUBS options include the possibility to raise debt. Such a possibility 
appears to be legally problematic. Article 17(2) of the Regulation on financial rules states 
that ‘the Union and [Union agencies], may not raise loans within the framework of the 
budget.’ At the same time, the Union already raised such loans with regard to balancing 
of payment difficulties caused by the increase in prices of petroleum products (cf. 
regulation (EEC) No 397/75124), to assisting non-eurozone Member States which are 
experiencing or are seriously threatened with difficulties in their balance of current 
                                                 
123 Cf. Articles 138 et seqq. of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009. 
124 Regulation (EEC) No 397/75 of the Council of 17 February 1975 concerning Community loans, 
[1975] OJ L 46, p. 1. 
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payments (cf. regulation (EC) No 332/2002125), to financing investment projects which 
contribute to greater convergence and integration of the economic policies of the Member 
States (cf. Council decision 78/870/EEC126) or to the European Financial Stabilisation 
Mechanism (cf. Article 6 of Council Regulation (EU) No 407/2010127). Revenue of these 
loans is considered to be ‘other revenue’ of the EU budget in terms of Article 311(2) 
TFEU.  
The contradiction between the prohibition of raising loans, on the one hand, and the 
somehow different practice, on the other hand, can be explained by the fact that, for 
predefined and specific purposes, the Union is allowed to enter into borrowing-and-
lending operations. The Union may, however, not do so in order to finance the general 
EU budget. The ability to enter into borrowing-and-lending operations must therefore be 
limited to a specific purpose in the legal act enabling the Union to raise loans. 
Furthermore, the guarantees for these borrowing-and-lending operations have to be 
included in the general EU budget. The borrowing-and-lending operations as such are 
then not part of the general budget. 
Since raising loans for the financing of the EUBS would be a specific purpose and since 
the loans would not be used in order to finance the general budget of the Union, the 
EUBS would be entitled under the existing EU budget law to raise debt in case the legal 
act establishing the EUBS fund would enable the Union to do so. 
5. POSSIBILITIES FOR DIFFERENTIATED INTEGRATION  
As it was shown under sections 2 and 4, a fully-fledged EUBS can be established without 
Treaty change, but the legal bases supporting the establishment of a EUBS require a 
unanimous vote in the Council. This leads to the final question whether a EUBS could also 
be introduced by a subset of Member States. There are two tools for a differentiated 
integration with regard to EUBS. It could either be done by establishing an enhanced 
cooperation under Article 20 TEU and Articles 326 et seqq. TFEU (5.1.) or by concluding 
an inter se agreement under International law amongst a subset of Member States 
(5.2.). 
5.1. Possibility to use Enhanced Cooperation  
The role model for every cooperation of a subset of Member States with a view to adopt 
legally binding rules is the Enhanced Cooperation in terms of Article 20 TEU. First, the 
procedural requirements for establishing an enhanced cooperation will be addressed 
(5.1.1) before turning to the substantive ones (5.1.2).  
 Procedural requirements for establishing an enhanced cooperation 5.1.1.
The procedure for establishing an enhanced cooperation is a three-step-procedure with, 
first, the authorisation procedure, second, the legislative procedure and, third, the 
participation procedure. In order to establish an enhanced cooperation between them, a 
subgroup of at least nine Member States has to submit a request to the European 
                                                 
125 Council Regulation (EC) No 332/2002 of 18 February 2002 establishing a facility providing 
medium-term financial assistance for Member States' balances of payments, [2002] OJ L 53, p. 
1. 
126 Council Decision 78/870/EEC of 16 October 1978 empowering the Commission to contract loans 
for the purpose of promoting investment within the Community, [1978] OJ L 298, p. 9. 
127 Council Regulation (EU) No 407/2010 of 11 May 2010 establishing a European financial 
stabilisation mechanism, [2010] OJ L 118, p. 1. 
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Commission, which may propose a decision authorising the enhanced cooperation to the 
Council. The decision whether or not the Commission will present such a proposal 
remains at the discretion of the Commission. The Council adopts, after obtaining the 
consent of the European Parliament, a decision with qualified majority amongst all EU 
Member States. The adoption of this decision is linked to two conditions: First, the 
objectives of the requested enhanced cooperation cannot be attained within a reasonable 
period by the Union as a whole and, second, this decision shall be adopted as a last 
resort.  
In its recent decision on the legality of the enhanced cooperation concerning the creation 
of unitary patent protection the CJEU had the opportunity to specify both criteria.128 With 
regard to the impossibility to legislate with effect to the entire Union ‘the impossibility 
referred to may [according to the CJEU] be due to various causes, for example, lack of 
interest on the part of one or more Member States or the inability of the Member States, 
who have all shown themselves interested in the adoption of an arrangement at Union 
level, to reach agreement on the content of that arrangement.’  
‘The expression “as a last resort” highlights [for the European Court of Justice] the fact 
that only those situations in which it is impossible to adopt legislation in the foreseeable 
future may give rise to the adoption of a decision authorising enhanced cooperation.’ 
However, not any ‘fruitless negotiation could lead to one or more instances of enhanced 
cooperation, to the detriment of the search for a compromise enabling the adoption of 
legislation for the Union as a whole.’ The authorising decision is therefore a ‘balancing 
act’ between the duty and need for negotiations with all EU Member States aimed at 
reaching a compromise, on the one hand, and the determination of a failure of these 
negotiations, on the other. The Council has a wide margin of political discretion for the 
determination whether or not to authorise the establishment of an enhanced cooperation.  
On the basis of this authorising decision the participating Member States may proceed 
with the legislative procedure. Decision-making is modified, according to Article 330 
TFEU, with regard to the Council, but explicitly not with regard to the European 
Parliament. All Member States may participate in the deliberations, but only the 
participating ones shall take part in the vote. The European Parliament, however, votes 
in its full composition.  
Finally, once a non-participating Member State wishes to join an established enhanced 
cooperation, this Member State has to notify its intention to the Commission and the 
Council. The Commission either confirms the participation or indicates arrangements to 
be adopted in order to fulfil certain conditions for participation and sets a deadline. If 
after the expiry of this deadline the Commission still considers that the conditions are not 
yet met, the non-participating Member State may request a Council vote on the 
participation. 
 Substantive requirements for establishing an enhanced cooperation 5.1.2.
With regard to the substantive requirements for establishing an enhanced cooperation, 
such cooperation shall not undermine the internal market and shall not constitute a 
discrimination based on grounds of nationality. It must therefore be in conformity with 
Primary as well as with existing Secondary law. This ‘non-regression’ with regard to the 
current state of Union law is furthermore combined with an obligation to only act in order 
to advance the Union. Enhanced cooperation is therefore only possible if it serves 
exclusively a better and quicker integration without harming the rights of non-
participating Member States. Finally, an enhanced cooperation can only be established 
within the framework of the Union’s non-exclusive competences. This means that all 
                                                 
128 CJEU, Joined Cases C-274/11 and C-295/11, Spain and Italy v Council, ECLI:EU:C:2013:240. 
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Union competences, which are not listed in Article 3(1) TFEU on the Union’s exclusive 
competences, are suitable for the establishment of an enhanced cooperation, including 
Article 352(1) TFEU.  
 Establishment of a EUBS under Enhanced Cooperation 5.1.3.
Since the legal bases supporting the establishment of a EUBS, as shown above under 
section 2, are all non-exclusive Union competences, EUBS could be adopted under 
enhanced cooperation. The most relevant obstacle for the use of enhanced cooperation is 
then the prohibition under Article 326(2) TFEU to undermine the internal market or 
economic, social and territorial cohesion. The prohibition to undermine the internal 
market is to be understood that provisions adopted under enhanced cooperation just as 
national law may affect the exercise of the fundamental freedoms but can be justified by 
mandatory requirements. In the case of EUBS social cohesion and macroeconomic 
stabilisation are such mandatory requirements. With regard to the prohibition to 
undermine economic and social cohesion, it must be noted that EUBS under enhanced 
cooperation won’t impede the social cohesion of the Union but only strengthen the one 
between the participating Member States. 
 Enhanced Cooperation and EU budget law: Can there be differentiation 5.1.4.
within the EU budget? 
Whilst in the previous section it was shown that the payment side of a EUBS can be 
established under enhanced cooperation, one has now to examine whether the financing 
side can also be adopted by means of differentiated integration. This refers in particular 
to the question of differentiation within EU budget law in case the financing of the EUBS 
is introduced through a new budget line in the general Union budget (see for this option 
section 4.1).  
In case the EUBS is financed by a dedicated fund, issues with regard to enhanced 
cooperation only arise when the EUBS is implemented by establishing a separate Union 
agency under Article 352(1) TFEU (see for this option section 4.2). When establishing the 
EUBS on the basis of an intergovernmental agreement, problems relating to the 
conclusion of an agreement of a subset of Member States are addressed below in section 
5.2. In the case of installing a dedicated fund outside the general Union budget, the 
financing side is embodied in the legal act establishing the EUBS on the basis of Article 
352(1) TFEU. Hence, if the legal act on the EUBS can be adopted under enhanced 
cooperation in line with conditions set out in section 5.1.3, the financing side as a 
necessary element of this legal act can also be adopted under enhanced cooperation. 
5.1.4.1 Differentiation with regard to revenue 
EU budget law allows for differentiation with regard to revenue. This can be seen by 
Article 332 TFEU. According to this article, expenditure other than administrative costs 
entailed for the Union institutions shall be borne, in principle, by the participating 
Member States. This means that the participating Member States must also have the 
legal possibilities to finance this expenditure. The wording of Article 332 TFEU seems to 
suggest that a subset of Member States should establish an own fund in order to finance 
expenditure resulting from an enhanced cooperation and seems even to require that this 
fund is established outside the general EU budget since the latter is financed by all 
Member States. Such an understanding of Article 332 TFEU, however, runs counter EU 
budget law. If understood in that way, Member States would have an easy way to avoid 
the procedures to establish the Union’s annual budget under Article 312 TFEU and to 
avoid the control of the use of the Union’s budget exercised by the European Parliament 
and the Council by simply establishing an enhanced cooperation amongst each other with 
an own budget. 
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Against this background, the main idea of Article 332 TFEU is less to allow an enhanced 
cooperation to deviate from EU budget law but rather that non-participating Member 
States should not bear costs of decisions on which they have no political influence. One 
may therefore draw the conclusion from Article 332 TFEU that the participating Member 
States should make use of the possibilities to differentiate with regard to the financing of 
the enhanced cooperation. Article 326(1) TFEU, moreover, confirms the present view that 
Article 332 TFEU builds upon pre-existing possibilities to differentiate with regard to 
revenue. This provision states that any enhanced cooperation shall comply with the 
Treaties and Union law. Since EU budget law is part of Union law and since therefore 
establishing an enhanced cooperation does allow for any deviation from EU budget law, a 
differentiation with regard to revenue must be covered by the existing EU budget law. 
The interpretation of EU budget law, which allows for differentiation with regard to 
revenue, is also supported by a precedent in existing EU law where a group of Member 
States finances a specific European project. It is the case of the ‘High Flux reactor’ which 
is financed by Belgium, France and the Netherlands.129 The Council decision on the 
financing of this project was adopted on the basis of Article 7 Euratom Treaty. The 
contributions paid by Belgium, France and the Netherlands are financial contributions 
made to the general EU budget by way of assigned revenue in terms of Article 21(2) of 
the Regulation on financial rules. These contributions are classified as ‘other revenue’ in 
terms of Article 311 TFEU.  
Based on these considerations, a subset of Member States may contribute financially to 
the general Union budget and assign these contributions to a specific budget line. 
5.1.4.2 Differentiation with regard to expenditure 
Differentiation with regard to expenditure is also allowed under the existing EU budget 
law. This follows from the fact that every expenditure is linked to a Union legal act. Since 
EU law provides for enhanced cooperation with regard to Union legal acts, the same must 
apply to expenditure. Otherwise, the general Union budget could not cover expenditure 
resulting from the implementation of enhanced cooperation. Article 332 TFEU is, 
however, based on the assumption that the general Union budget may also cover such 
expenditure. 
There is also a precedent in EU law that confirms the legal possibility to introduce 
differentiated expenditure. According to Article 10 of Regulation (EU) No 1173/2011 on 
the effective enforcement of budgetary surveillance in the Euro area,130 ‘the interest 
earned by the Commission shall constitute other revenue as referred to in Article 311 
TFEU and shall be assigned to the European Financial Stability Facility.’ Regulation (EU) 
No 1173/2011 defines payment obligations only for Euro area Member States and 
assigns the revenue to the EFSF, which is a body exclusively composed by Euro area 
Member States and which only provides for financial assistance for Euro area Member 
States. 
5.2. Possibility to conclude an inter se Agreement amongst a subset of 
EU Member States 
As an alternative to the adoption of EUBS under enhanced cooperation, a subset of 
Member State could also consider to conclude an inter se agreement amongst each other 
                                                 
129 Council Decision 2012/709/Euratom on the adoption of the 2012-2015 High Flux Reactor 
supplementary re-search programme to be implemented by the Joint Research Centre for the 
European Atomic Energy Community, [2012] OJ L 321, p. 59. 
130 [2011] OJ L 306, p. 1. 
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under International law. With the rise of the economic and financial crisis in 2008 
international agreements were used more frequently in order to adopt binding rules for a 
subset of Member States. This intergovernmental method of law-making was used when 
concluding the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and 
Monetary Union (TSCG, also known as ‘Fiscal Compact’) (25 Member States), the Treaty 
Establishing the European Stability Mechanism (ESM-Treaty) (19 Member States) and the 
Intergovernmental Agreement on the Single Resolution Fund (SRF Agreement) (26 
Member States). 
 Limits for the conclusion of agreements by a subset of Member States 5.2.1.
International agreements concluded by a subset of Member States (inter se agreements) 
remain subject to European law.131 Even though, by concluding the EU Treaties, Member 
States have not renounced their international Treaty-making capacity in areas covered 
by the EU Treaties, the Treaties provide for rules pre-empting the use of this Treaty-
making capacity. Firstly, international agreements concluded by a subset of Member 
States may not modify Primary law because their conclusion would violate Article 48 TEU. 
Secondly, international agreements have to be in compliance with existing primary and 
secondary EU law. They cannot modify existing rules. Thirdly, within the scope of Union 
competences, international agreements are pre-empted insofar as they concern subject 
matters covered by exclusive Union competences (Article 2(1), 3(1) TFEU). Insofar as 
they concern subject-matters covered by shared competences, international agreements 
are pre-empted to the extent that the Union has exercised them (Article 2(2), 4 TFEU). 
As the only exception to these rules, Member States may conclude international 
agreements as ‘trustees of the common interest’ in the absence of appropriate action of 
the Council, when the adoption of measures is necessary.132 These agreements must, 
however, be interim measures and to be suspended once Union measures are adopted. 
Furthermore, the principle of sincere cooperation as enshrined in Article 4(3) TEU limits 
the use of the Treaty-making capacities of the Member States. Pursuant to this principle, 
Member States are required, inter alia, to refrain from any measure which could 
jeopardise the attainment of the Union’s objectives and which could thwart the EU legal 
order. The system of checks and balances between the Member States, represented by 
the Council, and the EU, represented by the European Commission and the European 
Parliament, is at the constitutional core of the EU legal order. If, therefore, the adoption 
of a Union legal act is legally possible on the basis of a Union competence which refers, in 
particular, to the ordinary legislative procedure, such an act shall be adopted on the basis 
of this competence.  
If it were at Member States’ discretion to choose between, on the one hand, the 
conclusion of an international agreement, which is drafted by the Member States, 
negotiated by the Member States without any kind of formal involvement of the 
Commission and the European Parliament and, on the other hand, the adoption of a legal 
act, in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, where the proposal is 
exclusively drafted by the European Commission and where the European Parliament has 
the right to amend and to block any kind of provision, the whole system of checks and 
balances would be rendered meaningless. Member States are therefore under a legal 
obligation to sincerely respect the Union legislative procedures foreseen by a Union 
competence if the conditions for the use of this competence are fulfilled and the 
legislative procedure is initiated by a Commission proposal. Only with regard to 
legislating under the flexibility clause in Article 352(1) TFEU, the Court decided in its 
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132 CJEU, Case 804/79, Commission v United Kingdom [1981] ECR 1045. 
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‘Pringle’ judgment that the Member States may in areas, where the Union legislator has 
not yet acted, conclude international agreements instead of adopting Union legal acts.133 
Yet, the mere existence of an ordinary legislative procedure does not per se preclude the 
conclusion of an inter se agreement. Just as legislating under the enhanced cooperation 
procedure (cf. Article 20(2) TEU), concluding an inter se agreement can replace an 
ordinary legislative procedure if the latter failed or is likely to fail. This raises now the 
question of the relationship between the enhanced cooperation procedure and the 
conclusion of an inter se agreement amongst a subset of Member States. Especially when 
an enhanced cooperation on the basis of a Union competence, which refers to the 
ordinary legislative procedure, is possible, the attempt to legislate under the enhanced 
cooperation takes precedence over the negotiation and conclusion of an inter se 
agreement. This follows from the principle of institutional balance and democracy. If the 
conclusion of inter se agreement would lie within the discretion of the Member States, 
they could easily circumvent the participation rights of the European Parliament in the 
ordinary legislative procedure. Therefore, an inter se agreement of a subset of Member 
States may, within the scope of Union competences that refer to the ordinary legislative 
procedure, only be concluded if an enhanced cooperation failed or is likely to fail. In sum, 
this leads to the following legal framework for the conclusion of inter se agreement under 
International law amongst EU Member States. Such agreements are legally valid 
provided that: 
 Intergovernmental inter se agreements may not modify Primary law if concluded 
outside of Article 48 TEU; 
 Intergovernmental inter se agreements have to be in compliance with existing 
Primary and Secondary law; 
 Intergovernmental inter se agreements are pre-empted within the scope of 
o exclusive Union competences or of 
o shared Union competences to the extent that the Union has exercised them; 
 Intergovernmental inter se agreements of all Member States may only be concluded if 
a Union legislative procedure failed or is likely to fail; 
 Intergovernmental inter se agreements of a subset of Member States may only be 
concluded if an Enhanced Cooperation failed of is likely to fail; 
 Intergovernmental inter se agreements may not circumvent Union legislative 
procedures if there is a Commission proposal on the basis of a shared Union 
competence; 
 The use of an inter se agreement for establishing EUBS 5.2.2.
Based on this reasoning, EUBS could also be established by a subset of Member States 
on the basis of an intergovernmental agreement. With regard to the genuine EUBS 
options this possibility is subject to the fact that an enhanced cooperation on the basis of 
Union competences failed or is likely to fail. This is because the legislative procedure for 
genuine EUBS follows from the combined legal bases of Article 175(3) TFEU, which refers 
to the ordinary legislative procedure, and Article 352(1) TFEU, which requires a 
unanimous vote in the Council. 
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6. CONCLUSIONS 
The present legal analysis ascertained that a EUBS can be established within the 
boundaries of the existing Treaties. A Treaty change is only required for few of the 18 
EUBS options. The establishment of a EUBS has thereby to be realised by a set of three 
legal acts: (1) a legal act establishing the payment side of the scheme, (2) a legal act 
establishing the financing side of the scheme and (3) a legal act setting minimum 
requirements with regard to the regulation of NUBS and with regard to activation 
policies. In case the legal acts (1) and (2) can be based on the same legal basis, both 
can be adopted as one measure. 
As regards the (1) legal act establishing the payment side of the scheme, equivalent 
EUBS options V2 and V3 can be based on Article 352(1) TFEU and the genuine EUBS 
options V5 to V7, V10 to V13, V15 and V18 can be based on Article 175(3) TFEU in 
conjunction with Article 352(1) TFEU. Variants V8, V9 and V14 fail to strengthen the 
social cohesion within the EU and can therefore neither be based on Article 175(3) TFE 
nor on Article 352(1) TFEU. The EUBS options V1, V4, V16 and V 17 lack either an 
experience rating or a claw-back mechanism, wherefore they would violate Article 125(1) 
TFEU or in case of V4 do not meet the ‘conditionality’ criterion required by its possible 
legal base Article 122(2) TFEU. 
With regard to the (2) financing of the EUBS, the legislator has to decide whether it 
wants to include the revenue of the EUBS into the general Union budget or whether it 
wants to establish a dedicated fund outside the EU budget. In the former case, financial 
contributions can be raised from Member States (with regard to equivalent EUBS options) 
or from individuals (with regard to genuine EUBS options) on the basis of a regulation 
based on Article 352(1) TFEU. The revenue has to be earmarked for the exclusive use by 
the EUBS. As a consequence of this earmarking, the contributions would be considered 
‘external assigned revenue’ and can be included into the general Union budget as ‘other 
revenue’ without modifying the Own Resources Decision. In case of establishing a 
dedicated fund, the Union legislator has either to found a EUBS agency with an own 
distinct budget on the basis of Article 352(1) TFEU or, following the model of the EDF, 
establish a fund on the basis of an intergovernmental agreement. In both cases, the 
budgetary control of the European Parliament and the Council has to be included in the 
act establishing the dedicated fund. 
Finally, (3) minimum requirements for the regulation of NUBS may be adopted on the 
basis of Article 153(2)(b) TFEU in order to smooth the transition from EUBS to NUBS with 
regard to genuine EUBS options or in order to specify the use of the lump sum 
transferred from the EUBS to NUBS within the framework of equivalent EUBS options. 
The inclusion of minimum requirements for activation policies in this legal act is, provided 
that these minimum requirements are necessary for the social security and social 
protection of workers, recommended in order to address possible institutional moral 
hazard, which would affect the ‘no bail-out’ clause in Article 125(1) TFEU. 
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